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Abstract
In recent years, security of industrial control systems has been the main research focus
due to the potential cyber-attacks that can impact the physical operations. As a result
of these risks, there has been an urgent need to establish a stronger security protection
against these threats. Conventional firewalls with stateful rules can be implemented in the
critical cyberinfrastructure environment which might require constant updates. Despite the
ongoing effort to maintain the rules, the protection mechanism does not restrict malicious
data flows and it poses the greater risk of potential intrusion occurrence.
The contributions of this thesis are motivated by the aforementioned issues which in-
clude a systematic investigation of attack-related scenarios within a substation network
in a reliable sense. The proposed work is two-fold: (i) system architecture evaluation and
(ii) construction of attack tree for a substation network. Cyber-system reliability remains
one of the important factors in determining the system bottleneck for investment plan-
ning and maintenance. It determines the longevity of the system operational period with
or without any disruption. First, a complete enumeration of existing implementation is
exhaustively identified with existing communication architectures (bidirectional) and new
ones with strictly unidirectional. A detailed modeling of the extended 10 system archi-
tectures has been evaluated. Next, attack tree modeling for potential substation threats
is formulated. This quantifies the potential risks for possible attack scenarios within a
network or from the external networks. The analytical models proposed in this thesis can
serve as a fundamental development that can be further researched.
x
1 Introduction
The chapter starts with the recent development of communication protocols in power
industry and discusses their impact on cybersecurity of the substation infrastructure. The
chapter describes how conventional boundary protection mechanisms such as firewall fail
to provide a complete security measure to the networks of critical cyber-assets as well
as its limitations. This chapter also describes the required changes to improve boundary
protection of critical infrastructures. First, general cyber-attack performed by intruders
and different types of communication that facilitate such attacks are discussed. Then,
unidirectional communication gateway and how it can improve the cybersecurity of the
substation infrastructure is identified. Finally, a brief review of previous work carried out
in this area is elaborated in the end of this chapter.
1.1 Evolution of Power Communication Infrastructure
Power infrastructure is going through a revolutionary change due to the growing energy
demands, new standards in regulation, and growing dependency on IP-based communi-
cation. These paradigm changes are reflected in the infrastructure and operation of the
substation network. The development of communication protocols such as IEC61850 and
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) are some examples of such advancement. Traditionally
segragated, simple and proprietary networks are now evolving into more complex, widely-
connected, and interdependent networks [1]. Although these networks are isolated from
the public domain, the implementation of IP-based communication infrastructure poses a
risk for cyber-intruder to gain access to the critical cyber-assets [2]. While such transfor-
mation has made the interoperability between vendors possible and provided additional
functionalities such as remote control and remote accessibility, such transition has also
exposed to larger pool of untrusted networks and individuals. An unauthorized user with
sophisticated knowledge and tools can successfully penetrate into a substation network and
exploit the security framework [3–5]. To implement an in-depth defensive protection of the
cyberinfrastructure, weaknesses and access points shall first be identified. There have been
research on boundary protection of transmission line systems. An integrated relay based
protection scheme and the theory of boundary protection for high voltage transmission
lines connected to a substation is described [6, 7]. In computer security, the protection
scheme is divided in layers and these layers have a aggregate effect for the defense against
external attacks [8].
Cybersecurity of power grid control network, one of the nation’s critical infrastructures,
has received higher level of attention in United States due to the regulation of North
American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC-CIP)
[9, 10]. NERC-CIP standards have made a significant impact on utilities that deploy IP-
based communication infrastructures, which include critical cyber-assets that can have
the capability to control the physical facilities of the grid [11]. However, most efforts
have been focused on compliance of government regulation; establishing a framework to
systematically assess the component/system vulnerabilities for a critical cyber- network
has been limited [9]. NERC-CIP standards only include minimum protection requirements,
and compliance with the standards does not guarantee adequate level of system security to
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critical cyber-assets [12]. Stakeholders including utilities, vendors, and system integrators
remain committed to establish a specific business case for their system deployment in
addition to complying with the government cybersecurity mandate.
Figure 1: Substation Network
This thesis contributes to the development of analytical technique to identify cyberse-
curity vulnerability in a substation network. Basic characteristics of network security are
integrity, confidentiality, availability, and controllability of information flow [13]. Confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) are the three factors that are used to evaluate the
security of any cyber-system. Reliability and attack tree method are useful in measuring
some of these factors. In one hand, reliability measures availability as well as integrity of
the system. On the other hand, attack tree analyzes the confidentiality and integrity of
the system. These two methods together can evaluate the all three factors of CIA.
The system model for the substation network is depicted in Fig. 1. Security risk can
arise from network access points shown in the model. These access points can be connected
by vendors/users via corporate or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) net-
works to maintain the field devices in substation network. Security threats to network
security include malicious attacks by insiders or outsiders that can be executed by the vul-
nerabilities of loopholes in networking software or non-authorized access due to the poorly
maintained access control list of the network users [13].
1.2 Firewall Technologies
Conventional firewalls are deployed in the industrial control environment to protect the
critical infrastructure of the power grids that govern the physical conditions with control
2
and monitoring capability. While these have been successfully implemented to filter the
malicious packets between two networks, they are not designed to monitor the contents of
packets flowing through them. As the firewall technology advances and new techniques are
being developed, the algorithms of detecting anomaly in firewalls might not be effective
due to its design and specification that can affect strategic planning and management of
the firewall systems [13]. Misconfigured or incorrectly-planned firewall can result more
hassle in maintaining them than the network without firewall deployment [14].
1.2.1 Firewall Limitations
Most conventional firewalls provide false sense of security as it only restricts the packets
flowing through based on the strictly defined rules, which are extremely challenging to keep
them up to date [15]. It is possible for outsiders to access the firewall-secured network by
manipulating users and using high-level programming language. Most common type of
firewall technology is based on packet filtering, which allows only specific types of data
packets to transfer through security network. However, intruders can mask the source
of incoming packets deceptively to make them appear as they were originated from one
source which does not necessarily indicate the original location [14]. Another disadvantage
of such technique is that intruders can execute an attack through a less-secure already-
compromised access point to send the malicious packets.
Another type of boundary protection is application-based firewall that controls user
authentication to the network [13]. With such firewall, the communication between internal
and external hosts is not allowed under normal scenarios. However, if the external host
is compromised by an attacker, the internal host or network can be a stepping stone for
attackers to further explore new information for future hacking.
Proxy service has been recognized in corporate network that is implemented in the
boundary level of a network. This restricts direct communication between internal and
external hosts [14]. Both hosts communicate with the proxy servers instead of direct
connection between the two systems. The role of proxy server is to relay the communication
back and forth between the two. However, proxy systems can only be effective if there
is a restriction in the network to prohibit direct communication between internal and
external hosts [14]. If a direct communication is allowed to establish connections, then
implementation of using proxy server is bypassed and it no longer provides the desired
protection [14].
1.2.2 One-Way Communication
Restricting one way communication can drastically enhance the overall security compared
with the conventional firewall deployment. This is due to the limitation of hardware
capability that can only enable one way of packets flow which deters intrusion attempts
and unauthorized access. This technology has been commercially promoted, e.g., “The
Pump” developed by Naval Research Laboratory and “Waterfall one way" developed by
Waterfall Solutions [16, 17]. The senders and transmitters on both sides are defined with
hardware requirements which physically restrict the data flow between the two networks
in unidirectional manner. The hardware design of these “diodes” cannot allow data flows
in the reverse direction [17].
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1.3 Attack Footprints
Generally, intrusion to a network will require the following steps. First, the adversary
would investigate to progress to the communication network through the access points
(enumeration). Upon successful penetration, (s)he will continue to gather network in-
formation (learning and discovery). Once the attacker understands the control process
and information that is connected to the instrumental of physical system, an attack can
be planned to maximize the disruption [18]. This thesis emphasizes on the cyberdefense
framework to analyze the existing architectures.
1.3.1 Possible Attack Pathways
For the outsider attack, there are two ways of accessing the control system network. One
way is to go through the common path, which is through a network firewall. Another
way is by bypassing the common path to establish a direct connection with the control
system network. Therefore, when strengthening the protection level of the firewalls, it is
important to enumerate all access points and ensure the “backdoors” access are completely
eliminated.
1.3.2 Bypassing Security Framework
One of the most common ways to bypass the security framework is to directly connect with
the modems that are attached to control center equipment [18]. Attackers will attempt
every possible phone number in the area (prefix number of a utility) trying to connect to
the modem. Another way is by connecting to Remote Terminal Units (RTU). Usually,
modems and RTUs are configured with passwords. It is crucial that modems and RTUs
are protected with passwords that cannot be easily guessed [18]. Additionally, vendors can
have a direct communication link through dial-up modem in order for them to periodi-
cally upgrade the system or to maintain the system whenever required. Attackers can use
this direct communication path to identify a possible intrusion path. As a defender, enu-
merating all possible direct points must be checked constantly to avoid any unauthorized
intrusions.
!"#$%"&
'#($()$("#
*)$)+
!",,-#(.)$("#
/0%10%
230%
Figure 2: Bidirectional Communication
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1.4 Types of Communication
Three different types of communication can take place through a firewall as depicted in
Fig. 2. The first step is the connection establishment initiated by the external host with
internal server. This is a bidirectional connection that can be established with the acknowl-
edgement from the other party through through firewall. A unidirectional connection can
be established only by deploying the hardware-restricted directional devices.
1.4.1 Bidirectional Communication
For a bidirectional communication, data flows are in both directions. An example of this
would be the SCADA data that is sent from a substation network through RTUs to the
control center. Another type of communication is the control action that is sent to the
external host such as field worker to the control center or from vendor support to control
center equipment. Risks with a bidirectional communication is that an intruder can mask
malicious data and can send it through the firewall pretending to be sent from an authorized
source such as RTU or vendor support. If the firewall cannot identify this as malicious,
then the attacker will be able to obtain other critical information from these networks
which can be useful to further plan for a cyber-attack.
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Figure 3: Partial Unidirectional Communication
1.4.2 Unidirectional Way
In a unidirectional communication, the information flows in from lower security level to
higher security level and no backflow of data is possible [17, 19]. One-way communication
can have different levels of enforcements, where one or more of the initiative, data, and
control communications are restricted by the hardware design. There are several products
in the market which are based on one-directional communication. Although the data
transfer with such products is in one direction, the bidirectional communication has to be
established first within the network before it is relayed to external network. This can be
confusing as most one-way communication may still allow some kind of communication in
reverse direction as depicted in Fig. 3. In this thesis, one-way communication shown in
Fig. 4 [19] is discussed in three types of signals, i.e., initiation, data, and control.
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Figure 4: Complete Unidirectional Communication
1.4.3 Two Layers of Unidirectional Gateways
To improve the performance of unidirectional gateways, two layers of data diode can be
architected, i.e., 2 unidirectional gateways with one gateway at each side of the networks.
This will improve the security enforcement since the data flows have to pass through two
layers of filters instead. The use of two layers can practically limit the communication
to almost null. The potential intrusion would be a highly unlikely scenario as the uni-
directional communication restricts the external flow of the critical information. Specific
industrial protocol software agent will work with the hardware to send the data to other
side of network which does not require the acknowledgement of data received on the other
side [17]. For any intrusion attempt, the attackers require an immediate response if the
targeted hosts are responding in order to explore possibilities of access points. With this
architecture, the attackers will not receive any information and cannot exploit new infor-
mation.
1.5 Boundary Protection Within a Network
One-way communication is not designed to replace the boundary protection and other
protection technologies that are used in the individual computers. Various software such
as anti-virus programs and their updates are also critical to be used in substation hard-
ened computers. Anti-virus software help in maintaining system integrity by protecting
against malicious computer codes such as viruses and worms [20]. System Integrity check-
ers monitor any changes to important files that are critical to the substation network [20].
There has been increasing concern about using any protection software whether or not they
should be updated regularly. System managers need to make sure that the communication
takes place securely during such updates. The drawbacks are that each software patches
may be at risk to break the existing software dependency due to the compatibility of other
software modules.
6
1.6 Research Contributions
This proposed research explores a new tool in assessing system vulnerability. It identifies
the vulnerable access points and various types of attacks in a substation network. Network
architecture based on unidirectional gateways is designed to restrict any intrusion attempts
to access a network. Attack tree modeling is developed for the substation network to
demonstrate the vulnerability of each access point. Experimental results demonstrate that
the new architectural design of unidirectional gateways in a substation network enhance
the overall cybersecurity.
1.7 Remainder of This Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of
the substation-control center network and communication protocols used in the networks.
Vulnerability in different network components is also highlighted in this chapter. Chapter
3 provides the reliability modeling of new substation architectural design. Chapter 4
analyzes the evaluation of attack tree for a substation cybersecurity. Results and analysis
based on various attack scenarios are presented. Chapter 5 concludes with future research
recommendations.
2 Modern Power Communication Framework
A “smart grid” concept has been introduced in recent years to provide an envisioned agenda
to automate the energy configuration in an optimal manner. The legacy communication
networks will be upgraded with IP-based communication infrastructure that can comprise
of multiple mesh networks, where all the subnetworks combine to form a greater network
with multiple gateways and all meters have access to other gateways [21]. Communication
architecture for this envisioned network will be exclusively IP-based such as within a
network and between other networks that form a wide area network (WAN) [22]. An early
warning system against denial of service (DoS) attacks in the modern communication
framework using Gaussian process is presented [23]. The proposed vision has increased
interdependency with the telecommunication network [24]. For accurate risk analysis,
information regarding all interdependent infrastructures is necessary. Risk prediction of
the network requires complete knowledge of each infrastructure and modeling of each
components of the network [25].
Remote control and management of systems, units, and functions are essential features
of this vision [26,27]. The authors of [28] proposes a visual real-time monitoring system for
remote operations of electrical substations. While such system provides high-level visual
support for remote monitoring, successful intrusion into such system will provide attacker
with high-level knowledge of the critical infrastructure. It appears that implementation of
virtual private network (VPN) gateways to remote monitoring system has improved overall
system security of the protected network [29].
2.1 Anomaly Detection in Substation-Control Center Networks
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are the more
sophisticated boundary protection to improve the cybersecurity of power control networks
[25]. Implementation of domain-specific anomaly detection in the networks remains in
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premature phase. Most experts in anomaly algorithms in the computer community have
made decent progress in identifying network anomalies. A survey has been conducted to
identify methods used in anomaly detection [30]. Some proposed iterative estimation of
Hurst parameter for rapid detection, opportunistic sampling for classification of anomaly
detection, and network intrusion detection with semantics-aware capability are presented in
[31–33]. Data-driven technique based on the concept of symbolic dynamics and information
theory is described in [34]. Data reconstruction based on detection of random anomaly
with RX-detector is shown in [35]. A signal processing approach using statistical technique
to detect network anomalies has been proposed in [36]. Some researchers propose an
operational limits and effectiveness to conclude an intrusion [37]. There is an attempt
to infer potential cyber-intrusion by extracting irregular information within a substation
network [38].
2.2 Vulnerabilities of Power Communication Networks
Most architectures found in a substation network are established with multiple generations
of proprietary and standardized software protocols. Commercial-off-the-self (COTS) prod-
ucts such as MS-Windows, web servers, browsers, and application databases are commonly
used in these networks. Other COTS products commonly used are IT protocols such as
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP), and eXtensible Markup Language (XML). Vulnerability in these COTS
products will introduce existing vulnerabilities to substation networks. Similarly, network
security breach in a control system of the substation can also arise from the local area
network (LAN). LAN also provides remote access to control center and field devices. In
addition, most substation devices have Ethernet ports that are used for connection to the
IP-network. Similarly many legacy protocols such as Modbus, Distributed Network Proto-
col 3.0 (DNP3), Inter-control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) are IP-based. [39]
attempts to propose an information architecture for future power system communication.
There are new security threats arising due to all of these technologies. The following
subsections describe the main components of a typical substation-control center networks:
2.2.1 Substation Network
Substation network consists of two layers, i.e., process level and bay level comprising
of protective relays, actuators, and merging units. This network is connected to external
network through firewall protection. It is also connected to user interfaces of the substation
level. Substation network is connected to control center network through another set of
firewall protection. An attack can be launched from inside the network by insiders.
2.2.2 SCADA Systems
SCADA System has the salient features of monitoring and control for the industrial control
systems that is deployed in a private protected environment. SCADA obtains measure-
ments from the network topology and RTUs that are located in geographically expansive
area. SCADA is connected to the secured substation network through dial-up modems
or VPNs. Most SCADA instrumental information produces a massive amount of data
between control center and substations. It is challenging to have dispatchers filter out the
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information messages that can focus on high priority issues of the physical health [40].
The cyber-attacks upon SCADA systems can be classified into two categories: intelligent
or brute-force attacks. Brute-force attacks are carried by the attacker who is not an ex-
pertise in the specific domain of industrial control systems. Attacker with subsequent
knowledge and capability of specific domain would maximize the attack consequence with
their intelligence [41].
There are various standards and guidelines for designing the SCADA system. IEEE
standard for SCADA and automation system provides guidance about designing and spec-
ification of SCADA automation system [42]. IEEE P1711 is a trial-use standard for cryp-
tographic protocol for cybersecurity of substation serial links [43] and its tutorial for im-
plementing IEEE P1711 is discussed [44]. It is used for communication between SCADA
master and IEDs.
2.2.3 User Interface of Industrial Hardened Computers
User interfaces are located in the substation network as well as control center network.
This can be attackers’ interests for two obvious reasons. First, the user interfaces can
have meaningful and easy-to-understand messages about the working of the system. An
attacker can gain the understanding of the network through these messages. Second,
attacker can mask malicious data packets and make them look like they are sent through
a user. External attackers can use these interfaces to launch an attack.
2.2.4 Control Center Networks
Control center networks are protected by another layer of firewall from substation network.
Control center has the most critical information and the ultimate goal of an cyber-intruder
would be to get access to this area of the network. This is why the control center should
have extra layer of protection. The goal is to stop any attempt of an unauthorized intruder
to get access to this part of the network. However, control center can be directly connected
to field workers or vendor support through dial up modems. It is extremely important that
these direct connections are either avoided or made secure to avoid any intrusion through
this path.
2.2.5 Cyber-Intruders
Cyber-intruders are the unauthorized individuals or networks that are outsiders to the
substation network, who try to access the secure network with the intent of obtaining
critical information or damaging the system. Cyber-intruders lie outside of the protective
network and attempt to break the communication protocol of a secured network.
2.3 Security Threats
In general, there are two types of security threats to a substation network. First type
is called untargeted threat in which attacker is not interested in a particular data or
resources, rather attacker may only be looking to access the vulnerable devices without
any specific motive. Worms and viruses are most common type of such threats. Other
untargeted threats are unpatched systems, unauthorized access to system devices, and
insecure connections. Employees can also be a part of such threats knowingly or without
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knowing by accidental misconfigurations and improper use of workstations.
Second type of threat is called targeted threat. Organized crimes and terrorists attacks
are common motives behind such attacks. It is important to note that Al- Qaeda computers
in Afghanistan were found to contain documents on SCADA systems [45]. These attacks
pose more danger to the substation infrastructure because the attacker has a specific motive
and will repeatedly pursue it. Use of botnets for distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) and
extortion, and zero-day attacks fall into this category. Rival companies with the intention of
manipulating the market can carry an industrial espionage which is also considered targeted
attacks. Discontent insiders with password access can also launch targeted attacks to vent
their frustration with the company. Mostly, power system is operated in N-1 contingency
and loss of one single unit such as generation or transmission line can be compensated
by rerouting or using backup generation. However, targeted cyber-attacks can cause the
system to go beyond N-1 condition [46].
2.3.1 Within a Substation
Modern substations are deployed with devices such as sensors,IEDs , information proces-
sors, data servers, and IP-based communication infrastructure as shown in Fig. 5. IED is a
family of devices that are based on microprocessors and includes relays, actuators, servers,
gateways, and information processor. They are used for monitoring and control of other
Figure 5: Within a Substation
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substation devices and remote field devices, operations including power flow analysis, pro-
tection of the breakers, transformers, etc., and metering of the real-time data. Relays are
essential devices present in a substation which collect measurements of current and volt-
age transformers (CTs and VTs) and check system parameters in real-time. Programmable
Logic controllers (PLCs) communicate with relays, RTUs, reclosers, and satellite clocks.
They are used for event reporting, operation and control of substation, remote control of
field devices, and metering. Ethernet switches are used for communicating with SCADA
system. Information processor present in the substation integrates information from wide
variety of microprocessor devices and support functions such as high-speed data and logic
processing and protocol conversion. Remote input/output has ports for monitoring exter-
nal contacts and supports integration of SCADA, relays, and PLCs. Other devices present
in a substation are satellite clocks, Ethernet gateway, VPN end-points, and firewall devices.
Figure 6: Substation to Substation Communication
2.3.2 Between Substations
In the current state of art, inter-substation communication occurs through various tech-
nologies such as power line, satellite, optical fiber, wireless, and wireless network sen-
sors [47]. There are different types of substations present in the power system, namely
generation, transmission, and distribution substations. Substations are connected to other
substations for various purposes. For example, generation substations are connected to
transmission and distribution substations for supplying power. Traditionally, substation
to substation communication happens for power transfer and protection. However, with the
advancement of substation technology and the ability of the substations to carry out more
functions, substation to substation communication have larger objectives and functions.
Physically connected substations share equipment such as breakers, relays, transformers
between them. Data and status of these devices are exchanged between the substations
through the communication network. Simultaneous failure of interconnected substation
networks may cause cascading failures. During cascading failures, disturbance propagates
through the interconnected substation networks resulting in large area blackout. Attack-
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ers may be interested to cause this phenomenon by attacking interconnected substations
through the communication network. Fig. 6 shows the connection between two substa-
tions.
Figure 7: Substation to Control Center Communication
2.3.3 Between Control Center and Substations
Fig. 7 shows the communication network between a control center and a substation.Control
center lies in the center of the power system and controls substation, generation, transmis-
sion, and distribution systems. Control centers communicate with substations for protec-
tion and operation. Substation networks are continuously monitored by the control center
and such monitoring is essential for regular operation of the substation network. In an
event of failure of a control center, there is a back-up control center which takes over the
functions of the primary control center. Their operation is essential and are responsible
for power system reliability and stability.
In the past, control centers were established to processes the data from the SCADA
system. This was necessary as the substations did not have the processing capability. In
addition, control centers handled the operation, logical testing, and time synchronization
of the available data in the absence of satellite clocks. Since not every substation was
equipped with RTUs, state estimator in substations provided the missing data. It was
also responsible for creating sequence of events and analyzing disturbances. Probably the
only common goal substation and control center shared was time synchronization of RTU
measurements .
At present, because of the large amount of data coming from synchrophasors and due to
higher accuracy requirements for the data, control center are not capable of processing all
the data on their own. Therefore, substations are being equipped with more devices with
advanced communication capability that can perform most functions of a traditional con-
trol center. Substation devices are integrated into Programmable Automation Controller
(PAC) which is capable of processing data in the scale of control centers [48]. However, this
does not decrease the role of a control center; rather the interaction between substation
and control centers is even increased. Synchrophasors measurements from substations are
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sent to the control center, which feeds the information back to the substation for protection
functions. Wide area control and protection is based on the interaction of substations and
control centers.
With the development of IEC61850 substation communication protocols, modern com-
munication system check all measurements and status from substation data processing and
transfer them to the control center as messages containing added information [48]. Data
processing in both substation and control center allows comparison of measurement to
improve the quality of data. Control center operators can warn local substation operators
about any consistencies. In addition, control centers acknowledge any problems that could
not be solved at the substation level. The changing roles of substations and control centers
have brought increased interaction between these two entities. This has also given more
opportunities for cyber-attackers to intrude the system.
Usually, substations are separated from control center network by a firewall connection.
Such firewall is configured to allow TCP/IP traffic to IP-enabled devices in the substa-
tion/control center through specific ports. Such traffic is accumulated at a gateway device
and this gateway device communicates with the individual devices within the substation.
The direct communication with the individual devices is usually prohibited. However, such
traffic only includes device diagnostics and configuration data. The traffic containing the
operational data is communicated through serial ports. But there are some utilities that
use TCP/IP for the operational data that are coming from SCADA system. Although rare,
few utilities also have remote access to the SCADA and such connection happen through
a firewall.
Control centers are also connected to regional Independent System Operator (ISO) and
corporate network. Usually ISO communication happen through a firewall managed by ISO
and allows only the TCP/IP traffic. ICCP packets from utility are embedded into TCP/IP
traffic by an ICCP gateway and are sent through the firewall. Generally, the backflow of
traffic from the ISO connection is not allowed. So the security risks from such connection is
minimal. However, communication practices with the corporate network differs from utility
to utility. In such connection, the primary traffic across the firewall is for remote access and
data transfer. Some utilities have the database and web servers inside the control center
network, however others have it in the corporate network. The communication happens
through a firewall and is configured to allow users to these databases and servers. Network
vulnerability can arise through such connection.
2.3.4 Between Primary and Backup Control Centers
Backup control centers are designed to carry out the functions of the primary control center
in any events of major failure or unexpected emergency. The objective is to provide the un-
interrupted data and functionality with no impact on performance at all time. The concept
of two control center architecture has become more evident due to seemingly unavoidable
nationwide cascading failures such as blackout of 2003. During normal operation, primary
and back-up control centers exchange operational database and critical application files.
Primary and backup control centers operate in same environment, use identical data and
applications, follow identical operational procedures, and contain identical devices and
user interfaces [49]. Generally, these two entities are connected through corporate LAN
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Figure 8: Inter-Control Center Communication
and web servers and over the TCP/IP or Ethernet. If an attacker successfully penetrates
a control center, (s)he may also penetrate the back-up control center applying the same
techniques. Fig. 8 shows the communication network between two control centers.
2.4 Communication Protocols
IEDs have become the common features of substations since the last two decades. Most
recent IEDs are sophisticated devices that are capable of communicating with number of
vendors which will ultimately lead to the inter-operability between devices from differ-
ent vendors [50]. Because of these IEDs, the substation automation which relies on the
standardization of communication and development of common protocols have become
possible.
2.4.1 Modbus
Modbus is a communication protocol used for transmitting information from control de-
vices to the data management system and main controller [51]. In the substation network,
Modbus is used to transfer data from RTU to the supervisory computer of the SCADA
system. Functions like remote control and automated monitoring are supported by Mod-
bus [51].
2.4.2 DNP3
DNP3 developed around the same time as utility communications architecture (UCA),
which later became known as IEC60870. Previous protocols were proprietary and used
larger bandwidths. DNP3 limited the amount of bandwidth used. During the development
of DNP3, application layers on protocols were not valued as important in SCADA system,
so DNP3 used as few layers as possible. DNP3 uses only the three layers of open systems
interconnection (OSI) model: physical layer, data link, and application layers [52]. The
effectiveness of cyber-attacks against DNP3 increases rapidly if the DNP3 is embedded
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over TCP/IP [53]. In such case, attacks that are launched against TCP/IP can be used
against DNP3.
2.4.3 ICCP
Modern power grid is widely interconnected. Utilities need to exchange information such as
measurements, status and control data, scheduling, energy accounting, and operator mes-
sages. ICCP is the standardized communication across such interconnections connecting
utilities for real time data exchange. In the United States, ICCP is used for interconnect-
ing regional system operator to the transmission, distribution, and generation utilities. It
uses manufacturing messaging specification (MMS) and UCA specifications to encourage
multiple vendors to implement the common protocol [54]. ICCP is commonly used over
TCP/IP or Ethernet cable and are vulnerable to attacks that are generally used against
TCP/IP.
2.4.4 OPC
Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control (OPC) acts as the common platform
for Windows based softwares and process control hardware to communicate with each
other [51]. Because of this function of OPC, hardware and software development can be
treated as separate processes, allowing manufacturers to focus on just one aspect [51].
Three things are considered while standardizing the communication: 1) functions that
include protection, control, and monitoring, 2) services that include the transferring of
different types of data and, 3) protocols which depend upon the development of technology
[55]. Functions and services of substation networks are more or less the same since decades.
What changes is the technology which makes the development of new communication
protocols. Data transfers in bit sequences and these bit sequences depend upon protocol.
When technology changes, protocol changes and bit sequences need to be adjusted to
the new protocol. Substation automation system (SAS) can not be replaced every time
such technological changes happen. IEC61850 separates functions, and services from the
protocol and maps them to the new protocol [55].
2.4.5 Attacks Through a Firewall
Firewalls are the most common defense boundary technologies for industrial cybersecurity.
In addition to firewalls, industrial systems have other threat management systems such as
anti-virus, intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, anti-spam, and web filtering. Firewalls
are deployed in layers. The corporate network is separated from control network by one
or more firewalls. Generally, demilitarized zone (DMZ) is present between such networks.
DMZ acts as an intermediary between such networks. Communication usually happens in
two folds, DMZ relaying the communication. Layers of host and network protection lie
between networks and DMZ. Following are the most common methods for an attacker to
pass through the firewall.
• Phishing/Spear-Phishing
Phishing is a common way of attacking a corporate network. Attacker sends an email
directing user to open a website hoping to get user’s password. Spear-phishing is a
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targeted attack where the attacker does a research and finds out a vulnerable indi-
vidual, usually someone with a public face and finds out his/her activities such as a
meeting or a conference (s)he is attending. Attacker then forges an email impersonat-
ing someone from the meeting. In this way, attacker makes more convincing approach
to directing the victim to opening the attachment or clicking on the provided link.
Corporate network is vulnerable to such type of attack, but control network usually
have defense mechanisms that would prevent such attack. If not prevented attacker
usually drops a worm into the machine allowing remote control of the user’s machine.
• Steal a password
Stealing a password is another way of getting through a firewall. There are software
programs designed to work on the target computer as a method of keystroke logging
which is primarily used to steal passwords. Keystroke logging tracks the keys on
victim’s keyboard when the victim types a password.
• Compromise a domain controller:
Most control-center networks are designed to run on their own even in the absence
of external networks or inputs. However, usually passwords are stored in the servers
of the corporate network. In the event of an employee leaving the company, the
company revokes all the passwords or accesses of the employee from the system.
This is obtained by updating the domain controller. If the attacker has already
compromised the domain controller and created a new account, such account will
also be updated, giving attacker all the accesses to the control network.
• Attack exposed servers
If a server on the control network is exposed to the attacker or is compromised by
the attacker, every ports of the server are vulnerable to an attack. Attacker can then
launch attacks such as structured query language (SQL) injection, buffer overflow,
DoS, or password attacks.
• Attack industrial control system (ICS) clients via compromised servers
Attacks can also arise from clients or trusted networks via compromised servers. In
such cases, attacker do not need to initiate communication, it is initiated by the host
or client themselves. Once the connection is established, attacker sends compromised
files or data packets across the network.
• Session hijacking/man in the middle
For man-in-the-middle attacks, attacker fakes session ID usually through a fake Wifi
access port or hacked domain name system (DNS) server. Attacker does not initiate
or participate in the communication directly but inserts new commands to existing
communication session. Address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing on LAN is a
common type of man-in-the middle attack.
• Piggy-Back on VPN
Most corporate networks have VPN accesses for trusted users. However, the attacker
may have compromised the machines of such users. VPNs generally have broad rules
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allowing the user with wide area of accesses. Attacker can exploit such accesses
allowing the attacker to remotely interact with the corporate network.
• Firewall vulnerability
Firewalls are software and can have deficiencies such as bugs and manufacturer de-
fects. Manufacturers of these firewalls may also be controlled by a nation or terrorist
organizations with specific interests or intrusion goals. Although firewalls have rules
that only allow access to essential connections, there are usually large numbers of
essential connections in a large enterprise such as a utility company. Such manufac-
turing or operating defects may be exploited by the attacker to gain access through
the firewall.
• Errors and omissions
Over time security holes may have been created through the firewall. For example,
when a plant is down, the plant manager opens a firewall rule to allow access to the
maintenance staffs through the firewall to work on the problem. There may be large
number of such activities over time. If the operator forgets to revoke such accesses
once the maintenance is over, there may be large number security holes created
through the firewall. Attacker can exploit these security holes to intrude through the
firewall into the control network.
• Forge an IP address
Usually firewalls allow accesses only to the requests coming from recognized IP ad-
dresses. By forging an IP address to impersonate the trusted address, an attacker
can take over an existing session or initiate a new session.
2.5 Quantifying Security Features
To study the security level of a network, anomaly detection methods need to be employed
at different network access points [56]. Traffic distribution features need to be tracked for
anomaly detection [32]. Most common of such features are:
• Source IP address
• Destination IP address
• Source access point
• Targeted destination point
• Data size
These features need to be evaluated in a quantitative way to determine the vulnerability
of the network. Degree of vulnerability will depend on the successful data packets that
reach the targeted destination with minimum trials or in shortest time. The vulnerability
goes down when the communication architecture is changed from bidirectional to unidi-
rectional. More quantitatively, the following features are indicative of the cybersecurity of
the network. Together, quantifying these features will be useful in anomaly detection and
identifying the degree of network vulnerability to cyber-attacks.
17
• Time to access
For an cyber-attacker to launch a successful attack, the communication has to be
established first between the server and the host, so that the malicious data packets
can be sent. Longer it takes for this communication to establish, longer it takes to
launch a successful attack.
• Connection Establishment
In a bidirectional or partial unidirectional communication, when a successful com-
munication is established, a response is received by the attackers of the successful
initiation. In a complete unidirectional communication, they will not receive such
acknowledgment and hence will have no knowledge of their intrusion attempt. This
will largely discourage the attackers to launch any intrusion attempt.
• Number of Successful Intrusions
A successful connection of the attacker with the internal host is considered a suc-
cessful intrusion. This is the first step in launching an cyber-attack.
• Total Number of Attempts
External intruder without an expertise of the network will attempt many tries to
establish a successful intrusion. Instead of the attacker trying itself, a computer pro-
gram will attempt these trials. The probability of the successful intrusion increases
as faster the next attempt can be made. However, if the firewall is capped to allow
only so many connection requests in a certain time, it can effectively block a rapid
inflow of such requests.
• Volume of Data Flow
Once a communication is established, the attacker would want to send data packets.
These data packets can be malicious and intended to inflict damage or they will be
intended to extract useful information from the network which will help the attacker
to launch an even powerful attack. Either way, limiting the flow rate of such data
packets can prevent damage it can cause. Some attackers will be interested to flood
the data more than the servers can handle and thus stop the operation, limiting data
flow rate will avoid such flooding.
• Spreading of Malicious Packets
Most malicious data packets are designed to reproduce rapidly once they reach the
target. Anomaly detection should keep track of any such rapidly increasing data.
In case of any successful intrusions, this will allow the operators to take actions
before any cyber-attack is launched. Fast propagating malware does not need a
bidirectional data flow, rather one packet can be sufficient to inflict the malware in
the network [17].
3 Reliability Evaluation of Substation Architectures
There is no single metric or multiple metrics that can assess cybersecurity accurately.
NERC and regulators emphasize on compliance metrics but the system is not completely
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immune from cyber-attacks. There is a need for predictive metric to measure the cy-
bersecurity of a network. Three factors are considered important measures of security:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. On a power system network, confidentiality is
the least important because most of the power system data consists of voltage and cur-
rent measurements which do not have much significance on the attacker. But modifying
such measurements can create system imbalance and lead to failures in the system. Thus,
integrity of data is an important measure. The main goal of the power delivery system
is to adequately supply uninterrupted power to its consumers. Therefore, availability or
reliability is the most important measure of power system cybersecurity.
In this chapter, reliability analysis is used to measure the reliability of 9 common sub-
station architectures and a new architecture based on unidirectional gateways. All these
architectures consist of a corporate network and a control network. Within the substa-
tion network, four different topologies are considered: star, ring, simple cascading, and
redundant cascading [57]. Failure and repair rates of individual components are used to
calculate the overall reliability of each architecture. Typical SAS components such as hu-
man machine interface (HMI), industrial personal computer (IPC), network control center
server (NCCS), Ethernet switch (ESW), Ethernet interface (EI), and optical fiber (OPT)
are included in the substation topology [57,58]. Two models, repairable and non-repairable
models are considered for the analysis. In a repairable model, components can be repaired
after each failure and do not need replacement. While in non-repairable model, com-
ponents can not be repaired but have to be replaced after the first failure. Availability,
reliability, mean time to failure (MTTF), and mean time to first failure (MTTFF) are eval-
uated for each architecture using repair and failure rates. In addition, sensitivity analysis
is performed to investigate the effects of increasing or decreasing these rates on the system
reliability. Similarly, component importance is analysed to find out the importance of each
component on the reliability of the overall system architecture.
3.1 Reliability
Reliability is the probability that a system performs its mission successfully for a given
period of time. A system comprises of number of components and each component has
two states: operating or failed. Component reliability is the probability that a compo-
nent is operating successfully in a given period of time. System reliability depends upon
component reliability of each component and the design of the system. System operates
successfully if all the components operate successfully. However, even when a subset of
components has failed, system may still operate successfully. Availability is similar to reli-
ability and is defined as the probability that a system is operating successfully at a given
time.
3.2 Reliability Modeling
There are many different methods of reliability modeling. This thesis uses the reliability
block diagram (RBD) method. For this method, RBD are drawn for each system, where
each block represents a component or a group of components. In RBD, components that are
used together to perform a function are put in series whereas redundant components are put
in parallel [58]. Next step is to formulate mathematical equations for reliability evaluation.
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Evaluation procedure is presented in detail for each architecture. Comparative studies are
performed in order to evaluate how a system reliability depends on the arrangement of
components in architecture design and failure and repair rates of individual components.
Two models, repairable and non-repairable, are used to illustrate the effects of com-
ponent repairs in reliability modeling. Repairable model with reasonable repair rates can
significantly improve the reliability of a system. This thesis also investigates the other
indices of reliability, namely MTTF and MTTFF. These indices are used to estimate the
length of time it take for a new system or newly repaired system to fail. Mathematical
expressions are derived for availability, MTTF, MTTFF, repair rates, and failure rates.
Repair rates and failure rates for individual components are used to quantitatively evalu-
ate each of the architecture in terms of these expressions. In addition, sensitivity analysis
is carried out to investigate the effects of increasing/decreasing failure and repair rates
on system reliability. Further, component importance is computed to illustrate how each
component contributes to the overall reliability of the system. This will help to identify
the critical components within the substation architecture, especially in light of improving
the system reliability.
Some assumptions are made for simplicity of reliability modeling. First assumption is
that components fail independently of each other. Second, each component has constant
failure and repair rates. Estimated failure and repair rates for each component provided
by the manufacturer are used for the analysis. For the components whose manufacturer-
provided rates are unknown, hypothesized rates are used. It would be interesting to see
how the cybersecurity related failures and repairs impact on the system reliability. Since
the measurement depends on the structure of the RBD, it is important to draw the RBD
correctly.
3.3 Ten Common Substation Communication Architectures
Commercial Information technologies such as Ethernet, TCP/IP, and Windows operating
system are used for communication for both critical and non-critical infrastructure [59].
Although the interfacing of control equipment is made convenient by the use of such com-
mercial products, due to the lack of security in such products isolation of the substation
network (SN) with corporate network (CN) is essential. Firewall, router, and DMZ between
networks are common ways how these two networks can be separated. Most common way
of isolating a control network from industrial or corporate network is by using firewalls.
However, effectiveness of firewall on its own in control environment is debatable. There-
fore, substation networks have deployed various architectures beyond firewalls to isolate
themselves from the corporate network. Ten such common architectures are investigated
in this thesis [18, 59].
3.3.1 Dual-Homed Computers (DHC)
This architecture shown in Fig. 9 consists of installation of dual network interface cards
(NICs) in computers that lie between CN and SN. DHC can send and receive packets from
both networks, but does not allow the two networks to communicate directly, at least in
theory. However, it allows minimal network separation. Network configuration can be
adjusted so that DHC allows devices from one network to automatically forward packets
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Figure 9: Dual-Homed Computers (Architecture 1)
to the other network. In such case, the main purpose of network isolation is defeated.
DHCs are widely viewed as convenient targets by hackers.
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Figure 10: Dual-Homed Server (Architecture 2)
3.3.2 Dual-Homed Server (DHS)
This architecture as shown in Fig. 10 is similar to the DHC architecture, but in this case
network of DHCs is replaced by a single server. Usually, a host-based firewall is installed
in such server which will allow the traffic flow between two networks. Typically, a historian
server can be dual-homed server since it needs to be accessed by both networks. Just as
in DHC, DHS will not allow direct communication of traffic between two networks. Any
communication has to go through the shared server. This architecture requires less efforts
to manage and it is convenient to share common data between two networks. However, it
has poor security against traffic that has to travel from CN to SN.
3.3.3 Two-Port Firewall (FW)
A simple two-port firewall between CN and SN can be a convenient solution for network
segregation in some cases as shown in the architecture of Fig. 11. Most commercial firewalls
can inspect all TCP packets and act as proxy for common internet-based protocols such
as FTP and HTTP [59]. If managed well, such firewalls can be successfully deployed to
thwart most external attacks on SN. However, certain data such as historian server data
needs to be accessed by both CN and SN. So, the firewall must contain a rule to allow such
data transfer. However, malicious packets appearing to be historian data can be forwarded
to SN using the same firewall rule. Although this type of firewall in itself can be considered
secure, communication requirements of CN and SN between each other require vulnerable
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Figure 11: Two Firewalls (Architecture 3)
firewall rule-set that can be exploited by attackers.
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Figure 12: Dial-Up Access to RTUs (Architecture 4)
3.3.4 Dial-Up Access to RTUs
Dial-up modems (DUMs) are part of some SN and allow remote field devices and tech-
nicians to communicate directly with RTUs and other devices in the substation. These
modems usually work as back-up pathways when primary communication fails. Attack-
ers can exploit such communication by directly dialing the modems attached to the field
devices. Attacker will dial every phone number looking for the modem. It is not very
sophisticated to find these modems since most RTUs identify themselves. Successful con-
nection to the modem creates an alternative path for the attacker to reach the SN. Such
alternate path allows attacker to bypass firewalls and DMZs. However, the attacker must
break the RTU authentication and know RTU protocol in order to control the RTU. The
architecture as shown in Fig. 12 depicts the dial-up access to RTUs.
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Figure 13: Vendor Support (Architecture 5)
3.3.5 Vendor Support
Many SNs have agreements with vendors for system upgrades, patching, and maintenance
of the devices. A common means of vendors support is through a dial-up modem. This
also creates an alternative path for the attacker. This architecture as shown in Fig. 13
accounts for such type of communication.
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Figure 14: DMZ (Architecture 6)
3.3.6 Firewall with Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
One or more DMZs between CN and SN can be a significant improvement in terms of
security of SN. The architecture depicted in Fig. 14 shows such design. DMZ creates an
intermediate network between the two networks. Firewall in DMZ requires three or more
interfaces unlike two-port firewall. Each of CN and SN are connected to a separate inter-
face. Third interface is connected to a shared network such as historian which sits inside
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the DMZ. No direct communication is possible between CN and SN as each communication
initiated from these networks ends in the DMZ. Use of access control list will allow clear
separation of the two networks. However, it is still possible for hackers to compromise a
DMZ which would leave both CN and SN to be vulnerable.
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Figure 15: Paired Firewalls on Either Side of DMZ (Architecture 7)
3.3.7 A Firewall on Either Side of DMZ
DMZ can be made more secure by putting a firewall on each side of the DMZ. In this
architecture as shown in Fig. 15, firewall on the CN side will prevent arbitrary packets
from entering the DMZ. Similarly, firewall on the SN side will prohibit undesirable traffic
from compromised server accessing the SN [59]. Using the two firewalls from two different
manufacturers can further enhance security. Another advantage is that CN and SN can
manage each firewall separately. It will however require increased cost.
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Figure 16: Packet-Filtering Router/Layer-3-Switch (Architecture 8)
3.3.8 Packet Filtering Ethernet Switch (ESW)/Router
This type of architecture as shown in Fig. 16 consists of a Ethernet switch usually a
layer-3 or router between CN and SN. Usually, such switch is capable of basic filters to
control traffic. Number of such switch/router work as packet filtering firewalls as well.
These devices are capable of applying device to device rule-sets [59]. However, they cannot
prevent attacks that use package fragmentation. So, they offer minimal protection against
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sophisticated attackers. This type of architecture is only secure if the CN is highly secure.
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Figure 17: Unidirectional Gateways (Architecture 9)
3.3.9 Unidirectional Gateways
A more secure alternative is to use a combination of unidirectional gateways as a means
to segregate CN and SN. The architecture as shown in Fig. 17 design utilizes two sets
of unidirectional transmitters (TX) and two sets of unidirectional receivers (RX) creating
two separate DMZs. The sending and receiving data from CN to SN uses separate DMZs.
Each DMZ has data flowing in only one direction. The physical design of TX and RX
prevents any back-flow of data. This type of architecture can be considered more secure
compared to most other architectures.
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Figure 18: Substation VLANs (Architecture 10)
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3.3.10 Firewall and Virtual LAN (VLAN)-Based SN
Previous architectures treat SN as a single network. However, SN can be separated into
different VLANs where inter-area communication is not required. Simple layer-3 Ethernet
switches can be used to control communication to such VLANs. On a same VLAN, Layer-
2 switch can be used to control communication between devices. Architecture as shown
in Fig. 18 contains three separate VLANs, one each for PLCs, historian server, and
workstations. VLAN prevents unwanted traffic from flowing across the entire network.
VLAN can also be useful against some internal attacks although it has a limited scope. If
a DMZ and firewall are placed between CN and SN, this type of architecture can be very
secure. Variations in design can be used depending upon the network.
3.4 Repairable System Model
RBD for architecture 1 is shown in Fig. 19. Here, the SN is a star topology which is
same structure as architecture A from appendix. CN is linked to the SN by a network
of n DHCs. For simplicity, n = 2 is used for rest of the paper. Mathematical analysis
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Figure 19: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 1
of general series and parallel structures of RBD are shown here [57]. System failure rate,
repair rate, and probability of success are given by the equations below:
λsys = λ1 + λ2 (1)
µsys =
µ1 · µ2(λ1 + λ2)
(λ1 + µ1)(λ2 + µ2)− µ1 · µ2 (2)
Ps,sys =
µ1 · µ2
(λ1 + µ1)(λ2 + µ2)
(3)
Similarly, for a parallel system, failure rate and repair rate are derived as follows:
µsys = µ1 + µ2 (4)
λsys =
λ1 · λ2(µ1 + µ2)
(λ1 + µ1)(λ2 + µ2)− λ1 · λ2 (5)
MTTF for series combination of repairable systems can be calculated as follows:
MTTFsys =
1
λsys
=
1
λ1 + λ2
(6)
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Similarly, MTTFF for a series system is calculated as follows:
MTTFFsys =
1
λsys,MTTFF
=
1
λ1 + λ2
(7)
For a parallel combination of repairable systems, MTTFF is calculated as shown by the
equation below:
MTTFFsys =
1
λsys,MTTFF
=
(λ1 + λ2)(λ1 + µ1 + λ2 + µ2) + µ1 · µ2
λ1 · λ2(λ1 + µ1 + λ2 + µ2) (8)
3.5 Non-Repairable System Model
This section shows the reliability calculations for non-repairable systems [57]. In a series
combination, system reliability is the product of reliability of individual components as
shown by the equation below:
Rsys = Psys = P1 · P2 (9)
MTTF of a non-repairable system is expressed in terms of system reliability. For a parallel
combination, system reliability is given as follows:
Rsys = Psys = 1− (1− P1)(1− P2) (10)
Probability of success is expressed in terms of failure rate and time period as shown by
equation below:
P = e−λi·t (11)
The system reliability for a series combination is thus given by:
Rsys = e
−λ1·t + e−λ2·t (12)
Now, MTTF of a is obtained by integrating reliability of the system from 0 to infinity as
shown by the equation below:
MTTF =
∫ ∞
0
Rsys(t) dt (13)
3.6 Repairable System Model
Using the above equations, mathematical expressions for repair rates, failure rates, MTTF,
MTTFF, probability of success, availability, and reliability are are derived for architectures
1 to 10. Derivations of architecture 1 are show in this chapter. For the remaining architec-
tures, derivations are listed in the appendix. Architecture A forms a part of architectures
1 through 9. The derivation for architecture A is also shown in appendix. Also listed in
the appendix are the derivations for architecture A to D.
Following equations show the derivation of failure and repair rates for architecture
1. Architecture 1 is further divided into structures G, H, J, and architecture A; series
combinations of these 4 structures form architecture 1. First, failure and repair rates for
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each of these structure are calculated separately. For structure G, failure and repair rates
are expressed as follows:
λG = λFW + λESW (14)
µG =
µFW · µESW(λFW + λESW)
(λFW + µFW)(λESW + µESW)− µFW · µESW (15)
Structure H is further divided into structures H1 and H2. Failure and repair rates for H1
and H2 are expressed as follows:
λH1 = λEI + λIPC (16)
µH1 =
µEI · µIPC(λEI + λIPC)
(λEI + µEI)(λIPC + µIPC)− µEI · µIPC (17)
λH2 = λEI + λCNS (18)
µH2 =
µEI · µCNS(λEI + λCNS)
(λEI + µEI)(λCNS + µCNS)− µEI · µCNS (19)
Now, the failure and repair rates for H is expressed in terms of those rates for H1 and H2
as shown in the following equations:
λH =
λH1 · λH2(µH1 + µH2)
(λH1 + µH1)(λH2 + µH2)− λH1 · λH2 (20)
µH = µH1 + µH2 (21)
Similarly, failure and repair rates for J are derived:
λJ =
2λ2DHC · µDHC
(λDHC + µDHC)2 − λ2DHC
(22)
µJ = 2µDHC (23)
Now, the failure rate of architecture 1 is the sum of failure rates for G, H, J, and architecture
A as shown by the equation below:
λarch1 = λG + λH + λJ + λarchA (24)
Similarly, repair rate of architecture 1 is expressed in terms of failure and repair rates of
the 4 structures as shown by the equation below:
µarch1 =
µG · µH · µJ · µarchA(λG + λH + λJ + λarchA)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λJ + µJ)(λarchA + µarchA)− µG · µH · µJ · µarchA (25)
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3.6.1 MTTF
Now, the MTTF for architecture 1 is calculated as the reciprocal of the system failure rate
as shown below:
MTTFarch1 =
1
λarch1
(26)
3.6.2 Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success is calculated using failure and repair rates of G, H, J, and arch 1 as
shown by the equation below:
Ps,arch1 =
µG · µH · µJ · µarchA
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λJ + µJ)(λarchA + µarchA)
(27)
3.6.3 Availability (A)
Availability is the same as the probability of success as shown below:
Aarch1 = Ps,arch1 (28)
3.6.4 MTTFF
MTTFF for repairable architecture 1 is calculated in the following steps. First, the failure
rate for MTTFF is found for H and J. Failure rate for MTTFF of G is the same as that
of MTTF. MTTFF failure rate for architecture A is calculated as shown in the appendix.
System failure rate is the sum of the failure rates for these 4 structures. The following
equations show these mathematical expressions:
λH,MTTFF =
λH1 · λH2(λH1 + µH1 + λH2 + µH2)
(λH1 + λH2)(λH1 + µH1 + λH2 + µH2) + µH1 · µH2 (29)
λJ,MTTFF =
2λ2DHC(λDHC + µDHC)
4λDHC(λDHC + µDHC) + µ2DHC
(30)
λarch1,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λJ,MTTFF + λarchA,MTTFF (31)
MTTFF is the reciprocal of the total failure rate.
MTTFFarch1 =
1
λarch1,MTTFF
(32)
3.7 Non-Repairable System Model
Reliability of non-repairable model of architecture 1 is found as shown by the following
equations. Reliability for the structure G is calculated as follows:
PG = PFW · PESW (33)
Similarly, reliability for H is calculated by the following equations:
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PH1 = PEI · PIPC (34)
= PEI · PCNS (35)
= PH1 + PH2 − PH1 · PH2 (36)
Next, reliability for J is expressed as follows:
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Figure 20: Availability of Repairable Architectures
PJ = 2PDHC − P 2DHC (37)
Expression for architecture A is presented in the appendix. Using the expressions for
these four structures, reliability of architecture 1 is calculated as the product of individual
reliability as shown by the equation below:
Rarch1 = PG · PH · PJ · ParchA (38)
3.8 Results
Availability of repairable systems for 10 architectures is presented in Fig. 20. In the
figure, height of the bar represents availability. Comparisons can be made about which
architecture is more available and which architecture is less available. The results show
that availability of architecture 10 is the highest.
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Figure 21: Reliability of Non-Repairable Architectures
Availability or reliability decreases significantly for non-repairable systems. Fig. 21
shows the reliability of 10 architectures for non-repairable system. Reliability ranking
among the architectures is still in the same order as in repairable case. However, values
are significantly lower for all of the architectures. This shows that repair plays an important
role in making a system reliable.
Results for MTTF and MTTFF are shown in Fig. 22. As expected MTTF for repairable
systems is higher than the non-repairable systems. This means that repairable systems
operate for longer period of time before a failure occurs. MTTFF for non-repairable
systems is not relevant because a failed component cannot be repaired for such systems
and this quantity is not shown in the diagram. However, MTTFF for repairable system
is shown which is similar to MTTF. The reason MTTF and MTTFF have similar values
is because of the assumption of constant failure and repair rates. In practice, failure rates
tend to increase with the age of the component which would give a different result.
Sensitivity here represents how the result changes when failure and repair rates change.
variations of failure and repair rate in multiples of original rates are used to determine
the sensitivity. Impact of such changes on MTTF for repairable system are determined
for a number of combinations. Architecture 10 is used as the test case to demonstrate the
findings. The results are shown in table 1. In the table, rows represent the multiples of
repair rates and columns represent the multiple of failure rates.
Next, sensitivity of repair rates and failure rates are investigated separately. In the
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Figure 22: MTTF and MTTFF of Repairable and Non-Repairable Architectures
Table 1: Sensitivity of Repair and Failure Rates on MTTF of Architecture 10
1× 10−3 1× 10−2 0.05 0.1 1 10
1× 10−6 2392.90 290.99 57.96 28.96 2.90 0.29
1× 10−5 4171.30 293.29 58.36 29.10 2.90 0.29
1× 10−4 4968.00 417.13 61.42 29.33 2.91 0.29
1× 10−3 5024.50 496.80 92.20 41.71 2.93 0.29
1× 10−2 5029.20 502.45 100.03 49.68 4.17 0.29
1× 10−1 5029.60 502.92 100.54 50.25 4.97 0.42
0.2 5029.60 502.94 100.57 50.27 5.00 0.46
0.5 5029.70 502.96 100.58 50.29 5.02 0.49
1 5029.70 502.96 100.59 50.29 5.02 0.50
2 5029.70 502.97 100.59 50.29 5.03 0.50
5 5029.70 502.97 100.59 50.30 5.03 0.50
10 5029.70 502.97 100.59 50.30 5.03 0.50
15 5029.70 502.97 100.59 50.30 5.03 0.50
first case, failure rates are kept constant and only the repair rates are varied by multiples.
In the second case, repair rates are kept constant and failure rates are varied. In both
cases, changes in repairable and non-repairable MTTF are studied. Fig. 23 and 24 show
the result obtained for each scenario. Fig. 23 shows the sensitivity of component repair
rates on repairable and non-repairable MTTF. Fig. 24 shows the sensitivity of component
failure rates on repairable and non-repairable MTTF.
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Figure 23: Sensitivity Analysis of Component Repair Rates on MTTF and MTTFF
4 Attack Tree Modeling for Substation Cybersecurity
In order to apply a defense mechanism to cybersecurity problem, enumeration of access
points need to be exhaustively identified with an accurate assessment of the system vul-
nerability framework. An attack tree is a useful tool in modeling and analyzing the system
vulnerability. Previous method show the use of attack graphs to demonstrate the path of
a single attacker [60]. Howevever, in such models creating an attacker profile is necessary
which will not be feasible for unknown attackers. In addition, such models are focused on
a single attacker and multiple graphs are needed for multiple attackers. This chapter de-
scribes the attack tree method that is designed and analyzed for multiple unknown attacks
on a substation network. The analysis is evaluated based on indicators for cost, technical
proficiency of attackers, breach of trust, and noticeability. The proposed method can be
applied to evaluate potential cyber-threats in a substation network environment to identify
weaknesses for improvements.
4.1 Overview
Many remote unmanned substations have limited access by the vendors to constantly
maintain the security posture of the system. The deficiency of substation security en-
hancement and protection can be exploited by the vulnerability in the network. Often,
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Figure 24: Sensitivity Analysis of Component Failure Rates on MTTF and MTTFF
these substation-level networks are connected to control center networks where critical ac-
cess points may be penetrated by unauthorized users for malicious purpose. Substation
facilities such as power transformers, switchgear, and microprocessor-based protection re-
lays are considered critical infrastructure. The operations and monitoring of such facilities
can be accessed through the user interface in the substation network. This can also be
accessed by a cyber-intruder who has malicious intent to gain control over the network to
plan for an attack.
Due to the complexity of the access points and vulnerability, a graphical approach is
needed to systematically enumerate the plausible events for a substation network. A logic-
based method using attack tree is applied to this problem. The past contributions by
other researchers in security community emphasizes on high-level abstraction that can be
modeled by generic components such as firewall and password protections and relationship
between network topology [61]. Depending on the nature of modeling, this approach
has been utilized for modeling the client-server communication by identifying the general
vulnerabilities pertaining to this problem [62]. Also, enumeration of trojan horse detection
has been researched using the attack tree [63]. Other graph-theoretic methods include
using Petri net model to connect the cyber-component with the physical system for an
integrated modeling [64].
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Although attack tree method provides promising features to logically connect between
access points and vulnerability; however, this requires ongoing effort to maintain the vul-
nerability knowledge rules in the database. This knowledge-based technique is subject to
AND and OR rule sets of a substation to represent the network security protection. The
subsystem of attack tree includes leaf nodes with defined indicator criteria that are con-
nected by the parent node which can be an AND or OR gate. This qualitative modeling
for each subsystem can be flexibly reconfigured with a unique attribution of indicators to
a specific network vulnerability.
4.2 Fault Tree
Fault tree is similar to attack tree, but it lacks semantics and expressiveness of an attack
tree [65]. Fault trees graphically represent the interactions of faults in a system. Just like
attack trees, fault trees have leafs and nodes that are connected with the logic AND/OR
gates moving up in the hierarchy. However, fault trees represent the fault or shortcomings
in the system and does not account for the characteristics of the adversary. Instead,
attack trees represent the capacity, motivation, experience, and goals of an adversary. It
is important to look at system vulnerability in terms of adversary’s perspective as well.
In addition, fault trees lack the ability to capture the atomic details about the security
threat [65]. Therefore, attack trees are designed to overcome the limitations of the fault
tree and analyze system security from a different perspective [66].
4.3 Concept
Substation attack tree is represented by the vulnerability rule-set library to enumerate
plausible events that may be exploited by attackers. This enumeration is modeled by leaf
nodes combined with other rule sets of general information security to form the substation
security adversary, which is the root node of the tree. Fig. 25 illustrates the qualitative
modeling of the substation attack tree that consists of AND and OR logic gates.
Figure 25: Attack Tree
In general, the leaf nodes (bottom of the tree nodes) do not have any child nodes which
indicates the start of the scenario enumeration to the root node. The proposed model of hy-
pothesized attack scenarios includes attackers’ resource availability and their benefits that
can be motivated by monetary rewards, technical ability of individual hackers, and time
constraints. Most attackers’ motive is to achieve financial goals, to access critical/useful
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information, and to gain their organization visibility.
Proposed method enumerates possible hypothesized scenarios of attackers’ interest to
compromise a substation network. The security analysts can utilize the qualitative model-
ing of the substation attack tree to identify the security bottleneck for future improvements.
This chapter does not emphasize on the physical security. Instead, the attack tree enu-
meration for the substation networks is constructed based on the plausible attacks from
outside of the network or within the network.
These are based on intrusion scenarios from the leaf nodes, e.g., gaining access of the
substation control network by cracking the administrative passwords either from corporate
network or virtual private network (VPN). It all depends on the resources of attackers for
which the option (s)he would be able to identify. Similarly, when a corporate network is
compromised by the attacker, (s)he can identify other network access points to advance
the attacks. For example, (s)he can send malwares, identify boundary protection rules for
the gateways between other networks, or decipher the encryption for the data packets that
traverse to other networks.
The attacker may decide utilizing fewer resources, which is not noticeable to network
administrator. The attackers’ footprints and plausible events can be translated into the
scenarios for substation attack tree with indicators that attributed to attackers’ level of
strength and impact analysis. Formation of substation attack tree provide a ballpark num-
ber for system administrator to determine the worst case scenarios with possible improved
countermeasures.
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Figure 26: Vulnerability Analysis Flowchart
A flowchart is shown on Fig. 26 to explain the method of analyzing vulnerability using
the attack tree. Probability of attack and expected loss are dependent on cost for each
attack scenario, available resources, number of intrusion attempts, impact on substation
operations, and benefits to attackers.
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4.4 Methodology
Fig. 27 is the attack tree model of a substation network shown in Fig. 1. Indicators
are used to define the capability of the adversary, impacts on the defender’s strategies,
and the overall system of the adversary. These indicators are either boolean variables
or variables represented by mathematical formula. For example, an attacker’s willingness
to spend certain amount of money on a particular attack could be linearly related to
the amount of benefit to the attacker after the successful launching of an attack. How
such attributes are given to the indicators depend upon estimates based upon expert
opinion or statistical resources. Accuracy of such indicators depends upon the information
available regarding the technology, previous attacks, and surveys. A novel attack which
may not have occurred previously is still possible with the advancement in technology and
the motivation of attacker. No matter how much information is gathered from previous
occurrences of attacks, it is practically impossible to predict the occurrence of attacks.
However, in absence of such methods, an estimate based on available knowledge can be a
decent measure of vulnerability.
4.4.1 Capability of the Adversary
The indicators for the capability of adversary used in this thesis are breach of trust, cost
of attack, defender error, noticeability, and technical ability. Breach of trust is a boolean
variable and can be either true or false. It indicates if an insider’s help is needed to
launch a particular attack. Cost of attack is a continuous variable and it represents the
total cost for a particular type of attack. The cost can range from few dollars to millions
of dollars. An attack scenario that costs less financially is more likely to occur than a
scenario with higher costs. Another indicator is a defender error which is also a true/false
boolean indicator. An attacker may find loopholes in the network, software variants, or a
misconfigured firewall to launch an attack. These scenarios are considered as errors of the
defender and attackers will be looking towards capitalizing on such errors. Noticeability
is also an important indicator of attacker’s capability. An attack process that remains
hidden from the defender is easy to carry out than an attack that will be noticeable. If the
defender notices that the system is being breached, then the attacker’s attempt will most
likely be cut short. Final indicator of capability is technical ability which defines the level
of expertise needed to carry out an attack scenario. Noticeability and technical ability are
rated in a scale from 0 to 1, zero being the lowest and one being the highest. Such rating
is relative and depends upon the expertise of the tree designer.
4.4.2 Attacker Impact vs. Defender Impact
There are two types of impacts from a particular attack: impact to the attacker and
impact to the defender. Impact to the attacker is the benefit that the attacker gains
after a successful attack or the punishment, fines, or jail-time that the attacker needs to
pay/serve if the attacker is prosecuted. Benefit to the attacker can be financial benefit,
technical benefits, destruction of equipment, and injuries to the public or any other factors
that may motivate the attacker to launch an attack. However, attacker will be deterred by
the amount of fine it needs to pay or the amount of jail-time it needs to serve if prosecuted.
Similarly, there will be impacts on the defender which is different than the impact on the
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attacker. An attacker’s loss may not be the same as defenders’ benefit, so these two
scenarios are considered separately. For example, an explosion of a transformer may cost
millions of dollars to the utility, but the attacker may not gain as much.
4.4.3 Attack Tree Scenarios
There can be numerous possible ways for an adversary to compromise substation security
to achieve specific goal. For example, an attacker may crack the password to a RTU server
and change the current and voltage measurements or directly connect to the substation
modem by bypassing the firewall rules. Enumeration of attack scenarios represent options
available to attack’s adversary. Graphically, these scenarios are sub-tree of the adversary.
An attack tree represents the combination of such scenarios. Each scenario has some
associated leaves and nodes and has associated attack costs and benefits. A simple attack
scenario for the given attack tree is depicted in Fig. 28 and indicators for leaf nodes of the
scenario are shown in Table I.
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Figure 28: An Attack Scenario to Subvert HMI by Spoofing Data
4.5 Analysis and Results
Forty six different attack scenarios are identified for the attack tree depicted in Fig. 27.
Each scenario has a cost and impact associated with it based on which the likelihood of
the attack scenario taking place can be determined. The analysis includes the description
of each scenario, which contains all of the leaves and nodes associated with the scenario.
The majority of attack scenarios are based on following nodes:
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4.5.1 Attack TCP/IP Vulnerabilities
• Falsify IP information
• Hijack session by obtaining sequence number
• Capture network by eavesdropping session
4.5.2 Access to Industrial Control System (ICS) Network
• Bypass firewall between ICS and substation network
• Connect through wireless
• Login via vendor
• Connect via VPN
4.5.3 Attack Upon SCADA System
• Attack RTU by exploiting access control list (ACL)
• Directly connect through dial-up modem
• Attack through DNP3 communication protocol
At the leaf level the following were identified as the root causes:
• Decode encryption
• Crack password
• Send malwares
Bad data are fed into the network or the destructive commands are sent once the
communication barrier is breached. The vulnerability (V) of a particular attack scenario
can be represented by the following matrix:
V =

C
T
B
N

Where C represents the cost indicator, T represents technical ability, B represents
breach of trust, and N represents noticeability. Each leaf and node is represented in the
same way as the attack scenario. Total number of indicators defines the size of the matrix.
For an AND gate, for some of the variables such as cost of attack, the indicator values
from the two or more leaves are added together at the node.
C = C1,2,··· ,n = C1 + C2 + · · ·+ Cn
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In case of technical ability, the maximum of the two or more vertices is taken.
T = T1,2,··· ,n = max(T1, T2, · · · , Tn)
Boolean OR is used to represent breach of trust. Since the value is 1 for "True" and 0 for
"False," maximum of the two or more vertices is taken.
B = B1,2,··· ,n = max(B1, B2, · · · , Bn)
Noticeability is calculated by the following formula:
N = N1,2,··· ,n = 1− [(1−N1)(1−N2) · · · (1−Nn)]
Thus, the vulnerability of an attack scenario based on attackers’ resources is given by the
following formula:
V = V1,2,··· ,n
V =

C1 + C2 + · · ·+ Cn
max(T1, T2, · · · , Tn)
max(B1, B2, · · · , Bn)
1− [(1−N1)(1−N2) · · · (1−Nn)]

Figure 29: (a) Cost, (b) Technical Ability, and (c) Noticeability of Attack Scenarios
Fig. 29 show the resources needed to carry out each attack scenario. As shown in
the graph, thirty nine scenarios cost less than $4,000 to carry out the attack. In other
words, for someone who has $4,000 to spare, they have 39 different options to attack a
substation network, given that they have the technical ability to carry out such attack.
Goal of the utility that manages the substation should be to minimize the number of
attack scenarios and increase the amount of resources required to carry out such attacks.
The amount of resources required is directly related to the strengths of security measures
applied. Similarly, increasing the noticeability and technical ability to higher values means
that the possibility of an attack happening is even less likely.
Similar formula was used to represent impact indicators such as attacker benefit, at-
tacker detriment, and victim impact. Attacker benefit and victim impact for the scenario
was calculated using the sum of the vertices and attacker detriment was calculated as the
maximum of vertices. Different formula was used for the nodes with the OR gate. Number
of indicators and the formula can be changed to represent a specific network.
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4.6 Work in Progress
The method presented in this chapter can be a starting point for future attack tree analysis
of substation security. Readers may have some concerns about the method. Following are
the efforts in answering such concerns:
1. Ability to quantify the values for technical ability, trust, and noticeability: It is true
that these terms may not have absolute values or rather they vary from system to
system. But there can be no denying that these terms play their role in cybersecurity.
2. Accuracy of assessment of the substation’s actual risk: Cybersecurity risks arise from
the weaknesses in the cyberinfrastructure and advancement of adversary capabilities.
Although it is impossible to predict if certain type of attack will be carried out or
not, it is not that intricate to say that the system has a defense mechanism for certain
type of attack or the system is vulnerable to certain type of attack. We are interested
in analyzing if the defense mechanism is adequate against various types of known
attacks. For example, we can say that system is secure (or less vulnerable) against
the password attack since the system has strong passwords.
3. Inclusion of new vulnerabilities: Sub-tree library is the essential part of the attack tree
modeling. New sub-tree is created within the library if a new vulnerability is found.
The tree structure is linked to the library and does not need much modification.
4. Novelty of attack trees to system network: The tree structure will be modified to
represent the substation topology. Relays, actuators etc. that were missing in the
previous tree structure will be added to represent a novel case for substation network.
5. Scalability of seemingly exhaustive approach: The attack tree example that was
used in the paper was a single tree and does not contain any sub-trees. However,
an attack tree can have many sub-trees contained within a tree. Main tree can be
made to represent the topology of the substation network, while sub-trees are stored
in the library and recalled only when necessary. Result will be: This will reduce the
complexities in a tree structure as the main tree will be reduced in size. Single sub-
tree will be sufficient to represent a single attack type. Library and the topology of
the tree can be updated separately. Attacks can be filtered according to the security
criteria.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis presents an overview on the present day substation architecture, cyber- vulner-
abilities in substation architecture, and possible future improvements to enhance system
security. This thesis also introduces unidirectional communication and difference between
conventional bidirectional and unidirectional communication. In addition, different ways
of attacks on a substation are listed. Enumeration of 10 common substation architectures
is also presented in the paper. The major contribution of the paper is to present a re-
liability analysis of these 10 architectures. In addition, attack tree analysis method for
vulnerability analysis of a substation architecture is presented. Attacker does not have the
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knowledge of a system operator. Attackers work based on their own knowledge base. So,
knowing the power system from attacker’s perspective is equally important. Attack tree
analysis helps in enumerating vulnerabilities and identifying critical vulnerabilities from
attackers perspective.
Quantifying cybersecurity is a major concern in the field of power system security.
However, experts in the field have general understanding that confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (CIA) are the three factors that contribute to the cybersecurity. Out
of the three, availability and integrity are considered most important for power systems.
This thesis presents quantitative analysis of reliability of various substation communication
architectures. Reliability, availability, MTTF, and MTTFF are the basic quantities in
reliability analysis. Failure rates and repair rates of individual components are taken as
inputs in such analysis. Two models, repairable and non-repairable, are used to show the
effects of repair on the system reliability. Effects of repair and failure rates of individual
component and importance of each component in reliability of the system is analyzed.
Based on the method, reliability analysis of any substation can be performed to find its
vulnerability. Similarly, comparisons can be made between the architectures to find which
architecture is more secure compared to other.
Attack tree analysis technique provides a new dimension of the assessment for cyberse-
curity problem in the substation-level network. Vulnerability of a network does not solely
depend upon the historical events, but also depends upon the capability and motivation
of the cyber-intruder. The proposed model focuses on cyber-related events from the at-
tacker’s perspective. The proposed attack tree formulation can be enhanced with specific
network attribution in which its analysis can be used to predict the security flaws, impact
assessment, and develop countermeasures for loosely mandated security measures, such as
weak password policies, or default firewall rules. Effects of such practices can be alarming
to system administrator to make improvements. There can be more complicated and intri-
cate loopholes in security of a network, which can be studied with what-if countermeasure
improvements using the base case of attack tree. Such measures will usually result in
decreased number of possible attack scenarios and increased difficulty for attack scenarios.
Future work will be conducted by extensively researching the following items:
1. The relationship between failures and repairs impact on the system reliability.
2. Availability and accuracy of data is a major challenge in reliability studies. Trade-off
studies comparing the monitoring costs vs. reliability enhancements and optimization
for optimum monitoring points considering reliability and cost constraints can be
done in the future to further this research.
3. Reliability analysis in this thesis mostly compares the existing architectures against
each other. In the future, new architectures such as the combination of architectures
9 and 10, which has a VLAN as well as unidirectional gateways, can be studied. Such
architecture can provide improved security.
4. Failure rates are based on two states, failed and working. A multi-state model can
be used to include the transitional states where devices are partially operational or
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are working with decreased efficiency.
5. Attack tree analysis presented in this thesis proposes a general representation of a
typical substation network. In the future, this work can be extended to represent a
specific substation configuration for accurate analysis. Future research includes net-
work connectivity between substations, or substation and control center. This work
establishes the fundamental attack tree library that can be enhanced to represent a
more sophisticated network.
6. Instead of a tree structure, graphical method can be used to analyze the attack
scenarios as well. Such structure can be useful to represent the actual propagation
of attack.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Repairable System Model
This section presents the mathematical model for calculation of equivalent failure and
repair rates, MTTF, probability of success, availability, and MTTFF of repairable archi-
tectures A-D and 1-10. Architectures A-D and evaluation method are based on the model
presented in [57, 58].
7.1.1 Architecture A
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for archi-
tecture A.
Failure rate of A1:
λA1 = λEI + λIPC + λHMI (39)
Repair rate of A1:
µA1 =
µEI · µIPC · µHMI(λEI + λIPC + λHMI)
(λEI + µEI)(λIPC + µIPC)(λHMI + µHMI)− µEI · µIPC · µHMI (40)
Failure rate of A2:
λA2 = λEI + λNCCS (41)
Repair rate of A2:
µA2 =
µEI · µNCCS(λEI + λNCCS)
(λEI + µEI)(λNCCS + µNCCS)− µEI · µNCCS (42)
Failure rate of A:
λA =
λA1 · λA2(µA1 + µA2)
(λA1 + µA1)(λA2 + µA2)− λA1 · λA2 (43)
Repair rate of A:
µA = µA1 + µA2 (44)
Failure rate of B:
λB = 2(λBCU + λEI + λESW) (45)
Repair rate of B:
µB =
µ2BCU · µ2EI · µ2ESW(2λBCU + 2λEI + 2λESW)
(λBCU + µBCU)2(λEI + µEI)2(λESW + µESW)2 − µ2BCU · µ2EI · µ2ESW
(46)
Failure rate of architecture A:
λarchA = λDCP + λB + λESW + λA (47)
Repair rate of architecture A:
µarchA =
µDCP · µB · µESW · µA(λDCP + λB + λESW + λA)
(λDCP + µDCP)(λB + µB)(λESW + µESW)(λA + µA)− µDCP · µB · µESW · µA
(48)
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Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture A is calculated as follows:
MTTFarchA =
1
λarchA
(49)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture A is calculated as follows:
Ps,archA =
µDCP · µB · µESW · µA
(λDCP + µDCP)(λB + µB)(λESW + µESW)(λA + µA)
(50)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture A is calculated as follows:
AarchA = Ps,archA (51)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture A.
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture A:
λA,MTTFF =
λA1 · λA2(λA1 + µA1 + λA2 + µA2)
(λA1 + λA2)(λA1 + µA1 + λA2 + µA2) + µA1 · µA2 (52)
MTTFF of architecture A:
MTTFFarchA =
1
λDCP + λB + λESW + λA,MTTFF
(53)
7.1.2 Architecture B
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for archi-
tecture B.
Failure rate of C1:
λC1 = λESW + λEI + λIPC + λHMI (54)
Repair rate of C1:
µC1 =
µESW · µEI · µIPC · µHMI(λESW + λEI + λIPC + λHMI)
(λESW + µESW)(λEI + µEI)(λIPC + µIPC)(λHMI + µHMI)− µESW · µEI · µIPC · µHMI
(55)
Failure rate of C2:
λC2 = λESW + λEI + λNCCS (56)
Repair rate of C2:
µC2 =
µESW · µEI · µNCCS(λESW + λEI + λNCCS)
(λESW + µESW)(λEI + µEI)(λNCCS + µNCCS)− µESW · µEI · µNCCS (57)
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Failure rate of C:
λC =
λC1 · λC2(µC1 + µC2)
(λC1 + µC1)(λC2 + µC2)− λC1 · λC2 (58)
Repair rate of C:
µC = µC1 + µC2 (59)
Failure rate of D:
λD = 2(λBCU + λEI) (60)
Repair rate of D:
µD =
µ2BCU · µ2EI(2λBCU + 2λEI)
(λBCU + µBCU)2(λEI + µEI)2 − µ2BCU · µ2EI
(61)
Failure rate of architecture B:
λarchB = λDCP + λD + λESW + λC (62)
Repair rate of architecture B:
µarchB =
µDCP · µD · µESW · µC(λDCP + λD + λESW + λC)
(λDCP + µDCP)(λD + µD)(λESW + µESW)(λC + µC)− µDCP · µD · µESW · µC
(63)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture B is calculated as follows:
MTTFarchB =
1
λarchB
(64)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture B is calculated as follows:
Ps,archB =
µDCP · µD · µESW · µC
(λDCP + µDCP)(λD + µD)(λESW + µESW)(λC + µC)
(65)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture B is calculated as follows:
AarchB = Ps,archB (66)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture B.
Failure rate for MTTFF of C:
λC,MTTFF =
λC1 · λC2(λC1 + µC1 + λC2 + µC2)
(λC1 + λC2)(λC1 + µC1 + λC2 + µC2) + µC1 · µC2 (67)
MTTFF of architecture B:
MTTFFarchB =
1
λDCP + λD + λESW + λC,MTTFF
(68)
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7.1.3 Architecture C
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for archi-
tecture C.
Failure rate of architecture C:
λarchC = λDCP + λD + 2λESW + λA (69)
Repair rate of architecture C:
µarchC =
µDCP · µD · µ2ESW · µA(λDCP + λD + 2λESW + λA)
(λDCP + µDCP)(λD + µD)(λESW + µESW)2(λA + µA)− µDCP · µD · µ2ESW · µA
(70)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture C is calculated as follows:
MTTFarchC =
1
λarchC
(71)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture C is calculated as follows:
Ps,archC =
µDCP · µD · µ2ESW · µA
(λDCP + µDCP)(λD + µD)(λESW + µESW)2(λA + µA)
(72)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture C is calculated as follows:
AarchC = Ps,archC (73)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
MTTFF of architecture C is calculated as follows:
MTTFFarchC =
1
λDCP + λD + 2λESW + λA,MTTFF
(74)
7.1.4 Architecture D
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for archi-
tecture D.
Failure rate of F1:
λF1 = 2λESW (75)
Repair rate of F1:
µF1 =
2µ2ESW · λESW
(λESW + µESW)2 − µ2ESW
(76)
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Failure rate of F:
λF =
2λ2F1 · µF1
(λF1 + µF1)2 − λ2F1
(77)
Repair rate of F:
µF = 2µF1 (78)
Failure rate of architecture D:
λarchD = λDCP + λD + λF + λA (79)
Repair rate of architecture D:
µarchD =
µDCP · µD · µF · µA(λDCP + λD + λF + λA)
(λDCP + µDCP)(λD + µD)(λF + µF)(λA + µA)− µDCP · µD · µF · µA (80)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture D is calculated as follows:
MTTFarchD =
1
λarchD
(81)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of success of architecture D is calculated as follows:
Ps,archD =
µDCP · µD · µF · µA
(λDCP + µDCP)(λD + µD)(λF + µF)(λA + µA)
(82)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture D is calculated as follows:
AarchD = Ps,archD (83)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture D.
Failure rate for MTTFF of F:
λF,MTTFF =
2λ2F1(λF1 + µF1)
4λF1(λF1 + µF1) + µ2F1
(84)
MTTFF of architecture D:
MTTFFarchD =
1
λDCP + λD + λF,MTTFF + λA,MTTFF
(85)
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Figure 30: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 1
7.1.5 Architecture 1
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for archi-
tecture 1.
Failure rate of G:
λG = λFW + λESW (86)
Repair rate of G:
µG =
µFW · µESW(λFW + λESW)
(λFW + µFW)(λESW + µESW)− µFW · µESW (87)
Failure rate of H1:
λH1 = λEI + λIPC (88)
Repair rate of H1:
µH1 =
µEI · µIPC(λEI + λIPC)
(λEI + µEI)(λIPC + µIPC)− µEI · µIPC (89)
Failure rate of H2:
λH2 = λEI + λCNS (90)
Repair rate of H2:
µH2 =
µEI · µCNS(λEI + λCNS)
(λEI + µEI)(λCNS + µCNS)− µEI · µCNS (91)
Failure rate of H:
λH =
λH1 · λH2(µH1 + µH2)
(λH1 + µH1)(λH2 + µH2)− λH1 · λH2 (92)
Repair rate of H:
µH = µH1 + µH2 (93)
Failure rate of J:
λJ =
2λ2DHC · µDHC
(λDHC + µDHC)2 − λ2DHC
(94)
Repair rate of J:
µJ = 2µDHC (95)
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Failure rate of architecture 1:
λarch1 = λG + λH + λJ + λarchA (96)
Repair rate of architecture 1:
µarch1 =
µG · µH · µJ · µarchA(λG + λH + λJ + λarchA)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λJ + µJ)(λarchA + µarchA)− µG · µH · µJ · µarchA (97)
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 5 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch1 =
1
λarch1
(98)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 5 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch1 =
µG · µH · µJ · µarchA
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λJ + µJ)(λarchA + µarchA)
(99)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 5 is calculated as follows:
Aarch1 = Ps,arch1 (100)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 5.
Failure rate for MTTFF of H:
λH,MTTFF =
λH1 · λH2(λH1 + µH1 + λH2 + µH2)
(λH1 + λH2)(λH1 + µH1 + λH2 + µH2) + µH1 · µH2 (101)
Failure rate for MTTFF of J:
λJ,MTTFF =
2λ2DHC(λDHC + µDHC)
4λDHC(λDHC + µDHC) + µ2DHC
(102)
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 1:
λarch1,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λJ,MTTFF + λarchA,MTTFF (103)
MTTFF of architecture 1:
MTTFFarch1 =
1
λarch1,MTTFF
(104)
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Figure 31: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 2
7.1.6 Architecture 2
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for archi-
tecture 2.
Failure rate of architecture 2:
λarch2 = λG + λH + λDHS + λarchA (105)
Repair rate of architecture 2:
µarch2 =
µG · µH · µDHS · µarchA(λG + λH + λDHS + λarchA)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λDHS + µDHS)(λarchA + µarchA)− µG · µH · µDHS · µarchA
(106)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 2 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch2 =
1
λarch2
(107)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 2 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch2 =
µG · µH · µDHS · µarchA
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λDHS + µDHS)(λarchA + µarchA)
(108)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 2 is calculated as follows:
Aarch2 = Ps,arch2 (109)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 2.
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 2:
λarch2,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λDHS + λarchA,MTTFF (110)
MTTFF of architecture 2:
MTTFFarch2 =
1
λarch2,MTTFF
(111)
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7.1.7 Architecture 3
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Figure 32: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 3
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for ar-
chitecture 3.
Failure rate of architecture 3:
λarch3 = λG + λH + λFW + λarchA (112)
Repair rate of architecture 3:
µarch3 =
µG · µH · µFW · µarchA(λG + λH + λFW + λarchA)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λFW + µFW)(λarchA + µarchA)− µG · µH · µFW · µarchA
(113)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 3 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch3 =
1
λarch3
(114)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 3 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch3 =
µG · µH · µFW · µarchA
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λFW + µFW)(λarchA + µarchA)
(115)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 3 is calculated as follows:
Aarch3 = Ps,arch3 (116)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 3.
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 3:
λarch3,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λFW + λarchA,MTTFF (117)
MTTFF of architecture 3:
MTTFFarch3 =
1
λarch3,MTTFF
(118)
59
7.1.8 Architecture 4
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Figure 33: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 4
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for ar-
chitecture 4.
Failure rate of M1:
λM1 = λG + λH (119)
Repair rate of M1:
µM1 =
µG · µH(λG + λH)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)− µG · µH (120)
Failure rate of M:
λM =
λM1 · λDUM(µM1 + µDUM)
(λM1 + µM1)(λDUM + µDUM)− λM1 · λDUM (121)
Repair rate of M:
µM = µM1 + µDUM (122)
Failure rate of N:
λN =
λFW · λDUM(µFW + µDUM)
(λFW + µFW)(λDUM + µDUM)− λFW · λDUM (123)
Repair rate of N:
µN = µFW + µDUM (124)
Failure rate of architecture 4:
λarch4 = λM + λN + λarchA (125)
Repair rate of architecture 4:
µarch4 =
µM · µN · µarchA(λM + λN + λarchA)
(λM + µM)(λN + µN)(λarchA + µarchA)− µM · µN · µarchA (126)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 4 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch4 =
1
λarch4
(127)
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Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 4 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch4 =
µM · µN · µarchA
(λM + µM)(λN + µN)(λarchA + µarchA)
(128)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 4 is calculated as follows:
Aarch4 = Ps,arch4 (129)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 4.
Failure rate for MTTFF of M1:
λM1,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF (130)
Repair rate for MTTFF of M1:
µM1,MTTFF =
µG · µH(λG + λH,MTTFF)
(λG + µG)(λH,MTTFF + µH)− µG · µH (131)
Failure rate for MTTFF of N:
λN,MTTFF =
λFW · λDUM(λFW + µFW + λDUM + µDUM)
(λFW + λDUM)(λFW + µFW + λDUM + µDUM) + µFW · µDUM (132)
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 4:
λarch4,MTTFF = λM,MTTFF + λN,MTTFF + λarchA,MTTFF (133)
MTTFF of architecture 4:
MTTFFarch4 =
1
λarch4,MTTFF
(134)
7.1.9 Architecture 5
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Figure 34: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 5
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Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for ar-
chitecture 5.
Failure rate of O1:
λO1 = λM1 + λFW (135)
Repair rate of O1:
µO1 =
µM1 · µFW(λM1 + λFW)
(λM1 + µM1)(λFW + µFW)− µM1 · µFW (136)
Failure rate of O:
λO =
λO1 · λDUM(µO1 + µDUM)
(λO1 + µO1)(λDUM + µDUM)− λO1 · λDUM (137)
Repair rate of O:
µO = µO1 + µDUM (138)
Failure rate of architecture 5:
λarch5 = λO + λarchA (139)
Repair rate of architecture 5:
µarch5 =
µO · µarchA(λO + λarchA)
(λO + µO)(λarchA + µarchA)− µO · µarchA (140)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 5 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch5 =
1
λarch5
(141)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 5 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch5 =
µO · µarchA
(λO + µO)(λarchA + µarchA)
(142)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 5 is calculated as follows:
Aarch5 = Ps,arch5 (143)
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Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 5.
Failure rate for MTTFF of O1:
λO1,MTTFF = λM1,MTTFF + λFW (144)
Repair rate for MTTFF of O1:
µO1,MTTFF =
µM1,MTTFF · µFW(λM1,MTTFF + λFW)
(λM1,MTTFF + µM1,MTTFF)(λFW + µFW)− µM1,MTTFF · µFW (145)
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 5:
λarch5,MTTFF = λO,MTTFF + λarchA,MTTFF (146)
Repair rate for MTTFF of architecture 5:
MTTFFarch5 =
1
λarch5,MTTFF
(147)
7.1.10 Architecture 6
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Figure 35: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 6
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for ar-
chitecture 6.
Failure rate of K:
λK = λFW + λDMZ (148)
Repair rate of K:
µK =
µFW · µDMZ(λFW + λDMZ)
(λFW + µFW)(λDMZ + µDMZ)− µFW · µDMZ (149)
Failure rate of architecture 6:
λarch6 = λG + λH + λK + λarchA (150)
Repair rate of architecture 6:
µarch6 =
µG · µH · µK · µarchA(λG + λH + λK + λarchA)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λK + µK)(λarchA + µarchA)− µG · µH · µK · µarchA (151)
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Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 6 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch6 =
1
λarch6
(152)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 6 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch6 =
µG · µH · µK · µarchA
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λK + µK)(λarchA + µarchA)
(153)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 6 is calculated as follows:
Aarch6 = Ps,arch6 (154)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 6.
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 6:
λarch6,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λK + λarchA,MTTFF (155)
MTTFF of architecture 6:
MTTFFarch6 =
1
λarch6,MTTFF
(156)
7.1.11 Architecture 7
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Figure 36: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 7
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for ar-
chitecture 7.
Failure rate of L:
λL = λFW + λDMZ + λFW (157)
Repair rate of L:
µL =
µ2FW · µDMZ(2λFW + λDMZ)
(λFW + µFW)2(λDMZ + µDMZ)− µ2FW · µDMZ
(158)
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Failure rate of architecture 7:
λarch7 = λG + λH + λL + λarchA (159)
Repair rate of architecture 7:
µarch7 =
µG · µH · µL · µarchA(λG + λH + λL + λarchA)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λL + µL)(λarchA + µarchA)− µG · µH · µL · µarchA (160)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 7 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch7 =
1
λarch7
(161)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 7 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch7 =
µG · µH · µL · µarchA
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λL + µL)(λarchA + µarchA)
(162)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 7 is calculated as follows:
Aarch7 = Ps,arch7 (163)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 7.
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 7:
λarch7,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λL + λarchA,MTTFF (164)
MTTFF of architecture 7:
MTTFFarch7 =
1
λarch7,MTTFF
(165)
7.1.12 Architecture 8
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Figure 37: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 8
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Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for ar-
chitecture 8.
Failure rate of architecture 8:
λarch8 = 2λG + λH + λarchA (166)
Repair rate of architecture 8:
µarch8 =
µ2G · µH · µarchA(2λG + λH + λarchA)
(λG + µG)2(λH + µH)(λarchA + µarchA)− µ2G · µH · µarchA
(167)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 8 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch8 =
1
λarch8
(168)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 8 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch8 =
µ2G · µH · ·µarchA
(λG + µG)2(λH + µH)(λarchA + µarchA)
(169)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 8 is calculated as follows:
Aarch8 = Ps,arch8 (170)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 8.
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 8:
λarch8,MTTFF = 2λG + λH,MTTFF + λarchA,MTTFF (171)
MTTFF of architecture 8:
MTTFFarch8 =
1
λarch8,MTTFF
(172)
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Figure 38: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 9
7.1.13 Architecture 9
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for archi-
tecture 9.
Failure rate of Q1:
λQ1 = λFW + λTX + λRX + λDMZ (173)
Repair rate of Q1:
µQ1 =
µFW · µTX · µRX · µDMZ(λFW + λTX + λRX + λDMZ)
(λFW + µFW)(λTX + µTX)(λRX + µRX)(λDMZ + µDMZ)− µFW · µTX · µRX · µDMZ
(174)
Failure rate of Q2:
λQ2 = λQ1 (175)
Repair rate of Q2:
µQ2 = µQ1 (176)
Failure rate of Q:
λQ =
2λ2Q1 · µQ1
(λQ1 + µQ1)2 − λ2Q1
(177)
Repair rate of Q:
µQ = 2µQ1 (178)
Failure rate of architecture 9:
λarch9 = λG + λH + λQ + λarchA (179)
Repair rate of architecture 9:
µarch9 =
µG · µH · µQ · µarchA(λG + λH + λQ + λarchA)
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λQ + µQ)(λarchA + µarchA)− µG · µH · µQ · µarchA (180)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 9 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch9 =
1
λarch9
(181)
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Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 9 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch9 =
µG · µH · µQ · µarchA
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λQ + µQ)(λarchA + µarchA)
(182)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 9 is calculated as follows:
Aarch9 = Ps,arch9 (183)
Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 9.
Failure rate for MTTFF of Q:
λQ,MTTFF =
λQ1 · λQ2(λQ1 + µQ1 + λQ2 + µQ2)
(λQ1 + λQ2)(λQ1 + µQ1 + λQ2 + µQ2) + µQ1 · µQ2 (184)
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 9:
λarch9,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λQ,MTTF + λarchA,MTTFF (185)
MTTFF of architecture 9:
MTTFFarch9 =
1
λarch9,MTTFF
(186)
7.1.14 Architecture 10
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Figure 39: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture 10
Following equations show the calculation of equivalent failure and repair rates for ar-
chitecture 10.
Failure rate of T:
λT = λFW + λDMZ + λESW (187)
68
Repair rate of T:
µT =
µFW · µDMZ · µESW(λFW + λDMZ + λESW)
(λFW + µFW)(λDMZ + µDMZ)(λESW + µESW)− µFW · µDMZ · µESW (188)
Failure rate of U1:
λU1 = λESW + λEI + λIPC + λHMI (189)
Repair rate of U1:
µU1 =
µESW · µEI · µIPC · µHMI(λESW + λEI + λIPC + λHMI)
(λESW + µESW)(λEI + µEI)(λIPC + µIPC)(λHMI + µHMI)− µESW · µEI · µIPC · µHMI
(190)
Failure rate of U3:
λU3 = λB + λESW (191)
Repair rate of U3:
µU3 =
µESW · µB(λESW + λB)
(λESW + µESW)(λB + µB)− µESW · µB (192)
Failure rate of U:
λU =
λU1 · λA2 · λU3(µU1 + µA2 + µU3)
(λU1 + µU1)(λA2 + µA2)(λU3 + µU3)− λU1 · λA2 · λU3 (193)
Repair rate of U:
µU = µU1 + µA2 + µU3 (194)
Failure rate of architecture 10:
λarch10 = λG + λH + λT + λU + λDCP (195)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF of architecture 10 is calculated as follows:
MTTFarch10 =
1
λarch10
(196)
Probability of Success (P)
Probability of success of architecture 10 is calculated as follows:
Ps,arch10 =
µG · µH · µT · µU · µDCP
(λG + µG)(λH + µH)(λT + µT)(λU + µU)(λDCP + µDCP)
(197)
Availability (A)
Availability of architecture 10 is calculated as follows:
Aarch10 = Ps,arch10 (198)
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Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF)
Following equations show the calculation of MTTFF for architecture 10.
Failure rate for MTTFF of U:
λU,MTTFF =
λU1 · λA2 · λU3(λU1 + µU1 + λA2 + µA2 + λU3 + µU3)
(λU1 + λA2 + λU3)(λU1 + µU1 + λA2 + µA2 + λU3 + µU3) + µU1 · µA2 · µU3
(199)
Failure rate for MTTFF of architecture 10:
λarch10,MTTFF = λG + λH,MTTFF + λT + λU,MTTFF + λDCP (200)
MTTFF of architecture 10:
MTTFFarch10 =
1
λarch10,MTTFF
(201)
7.2 Non-Repairable System Model
This section presents the mathematical model for calculating reliability and MTTF of
architectures A to D and reliability of architectures 1-10 for non-repairable system model.
7.2.1 Reliability: Architecture A
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture A.
Probability of success of A1:
PA1 = PEI · PIPC · PHMI (202)
Probability of success of A2:
PA2 = PEI · PNCCS (203)
Probability of success of A:
PA = 1− (1− PA1)(1− PA2) (204)
= PA1 + PA2 − PA1 · PA2 (205)
Probability of success of B:
PB = P
2
BCU · P 2EI · P 2ESW (206)
Reliability of architecture A:
RarchA = ParchA = PDCP · PB · PESW · PA (207)
RarchA = PDCP·P 2BCU·P 2EI·P 2ESW·PESW(PEI·PIPC·PHMI+PEI·PNCCS−P 2EI·PIPC·PHMIPNCCS)
(208)
RarchA = PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 3ESW[PIPC · PHMI(1− PEI · PNCCS) + PNCCS] (209)
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Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF for architecture A is calculated as follows.
Reliability of architecture A in expanded form:
RarchA =PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 3ESW · PIPC · PHMI
− PDCP · P 2BCU · P 4EI · P 3ESW · PIPC · PHMI · PNCCS
+ PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 3ESW · PNCCS
(210)
MTTF of architecture A:
MTTFarchA =
1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λESW + 3λEI + λIPC + λHMI
+
1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λESW + 3λEI + λNCCS
− 1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λESW + 4λEI + λIPC + λHMI + λNCCS
(211)
7.2.2 Reliability: Architecture B
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture B.
Probability of success of C1:
PC1 = PESW · PEI · PIPC · PHMI (212)
Probability of success of C2:
PC2 = PESW · PEI · PNCCS (213)
Probability of success of C:
PC = PC1 + PC2 − PC1 · PC2 (214)
Probability of success of D:
PD = P
2
BCU · P 2EI (215)
Reliability of architecture B:
RarchB = ParchB = PDCP · PD · PESW · PC (216)
RarchB =PDCP · P 2BCU · P 2EI · PESW(PESW · PEI · PIPC · PHMI
+ PESW · PEI · PNCCS − P 2ESW · P 2EI · PIPC · PHMIPNCCS)
(217)
RarchB = PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW[PIPC · PHMI(1− PESW · PEI · PNCCS) + PNCCS] (218)
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Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF for architecture B is calculated as follows.
Reliability of architecture B in expanded form:
RarchB =PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW · PIPC · PHMI
− PDCP · P 2BCU · P 4EI · P 3ESW · PIPC · PHMI · PNCCS
+ PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW · PNCCS
(219)
MTTF of architecture B:
MTTFarchB =
1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 2λESW + λIPC + λHMI
+
1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 2λESW + λNCCS
− 1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 4λEI + 3λESW + λIPC + λHMI + λNCCS
(220)
7.2.3 Reliability: Architecture C
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture C.
Reliability of architecture C:
RarchC = ParchC = PDCP · PD · P 2ESW · PA (221)
RarchC = PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW[PIPC · PHMI(1− PEI · PNCCS) + PNCCS] (222)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF for architecture C is calculated as follows.
Reliability of architecture C in expanded form:
RarchC =PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW · PIPC · PHMI
− PDCP · P 2BCU · P 4EI · P 2ESW · PIPC · PHMI · PNCCS
+ PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW · PNCCS
(223)
MTTF of architecture C:
MTTFarchC =
1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 2λESW + λIPC + λHMI
+
1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 2λESW + λNCCS
− 1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 4λEI + 2λESW + λIPC + λHMI + λNCCS
(224)
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7.2.4 Reliability: Architecture D
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture D.
Probability of success of F1:
PF1 = P
2
ESW (225)
Probability of success of F:
PF = 1− (1− PF1)2 (226)
= P 2ESW(2− P 2ESW) (227)
Reliability of architecture D:
RarchD = ParchD = PDCP · PD · PF · PA (228)
RarchD = PDCP ·P 2BCU ·P 2EI ·P 2ESW(2−P 2ESW)PEI[PIPC ·PHMI(1−PEI ·PNCCS)+PNCCS] (229)
RarchD = PDCP ·P 2BCU ·P 3EI ·P 2ESW(2−P 2ESW)[PIPC ·PHMI(1−PEI ·PNCCS)+PNCCS] (230)
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF for architecture D is calculated as follows.
Reliability of architecture D in expanded form:
RarchD =2PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW · PIPC · PHMI
+ 2PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 2ESW · PNCCS
− 2PDCP · P 2BCU · P 4EI · P 2ESW · PIPC · PHMI · PNCCS
− PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 4ESW · PIPC · PHMI
− PDCP · P 2BCU · P 3EI · P 4ESW · PNCCS
+ PDCP · P 2BCU · P 4EI · P 4ESW · PIPC · PHMI · PNCCS
(231)
MTTF of architecture D:
MTTFarchD =
2
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 2λESW + λIPC + λHMI
+
2
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 2λESW + λNCCS
− 2
λDCP + 2λBCU + 4λEI + 2λESW + λIPC + λHMI + λNCCS
− 1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 4λESW + λIPC + λHMI
− 1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 3λEI + 4λESW + λNCCS
− 1
λDCP + 2λBCU + 4λEI + 4λESW + λIPC + λHMI + λNCCS
(232)
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7.2.5 Reliability: Architecture 1
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 1.
Probability of success of G:
PG = PFW · PESW (233)
Probability of success of H1:
PH1 = PEI · PIPC (234)
Probability of success of H2:
PH2 = PEI · PCNS (235)
Probability of success of H:
PH = PH1 + PH2 − PH1 · PH2 (236)
Probability of success of J:
PJ = 2PDHC − P 2DHC (237)
Reliability of architecture 1:
Rarch1 = PG · PH · PJ · ParchA (238)
7.2.6 Reliability: Architecture 2
Reliability of architecture 2 is calculated as follows:
Rarch2 = PG · PH · PDHS · ParchA (239)
7.2.7 Reliability: Architecture 3
Reliability of architecture 2 is calculated as follows:
Rarch3 = PG · PH · PFW · ParchA (240)
7.2.8 Reliability: Architecture 4
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 4.
Probability of success of M1:
PM1 = PG · PH (241)
Probability of success of M:
PM = PM1 + PDUM − PM1 · PDUM (242)
Probability of success of N:
PN = PFW + PDUM − PFW · PDUM (243)
Reliability of architecture 4:
Rarch4 = PM · PN · ParchA (244)
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7.2.9 Reliability: Architecture 5
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 5.
Probability of success of O1:
PO1 = PM1 · PFW (245)
Probability of success of O:
PO = PO1 + PDUM − PO1 · PDUM (246)
Reliability of architecture 5:
Rarch5 = PO · ParchA (247)
7.2.10 Reliability: Architecture 6
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 6.
Probability of success of K:
PK = PFW · PDMZ (248)
Reliability of architecture 6:
Rarch6 = PG · PH · PK · ParchA (249)
7.2.11 Reliability: Architecture 7
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 7.
Probability of success of L:
PL = P
2
FW · PDMZ (250)
Reliability of architecture 7:
Rarch7 = PG · PH · PL · ParchA (251)
7.2.12 Reliability: Architecture 8
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 8.
Rarch8 = P
2
G · PH · ParchA (252)
7.2.13 Reliability: Architecture 9
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 9.
Probability of success of Q1:
PQ1 = PFW · PTX · PRX · PDMZ (253)
Probability of success of Q2:
PQ2 = PQ1 (254)
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Probability of success of Q:
PQ = 2PQ1 − P 2Q1 (255)
Reliability of architecture 9:
Rarch9 = PG · PH · PQ · ParchA (256)
7.2.14 Reliability: Architecture 10
Following equations show the calculation of reliability for architecture 10.
Probability of success of T:
PT = PFW · PDMZ · PESW (257)
Probability of success of U1:
PU1 = PESW · PEI · PIPC · PHMI (258)
Probability of success of U3:
PU3 = PESW · PB (259)
Probability of success of U:
PU = 1− (1− PU1)(1 − PA2)(1 − PU3) (260)
Reliability of architecture 10:
Rarch10 = PG · PH · PT · PU · PDCP (261)
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